

JPRS 71718

21 August 1978

TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1371

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for Public Release
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20000410 152

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET	1. Report No. JPRS 71718	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
	4. Title and Subtitle TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1371		5. Report Date 21 August 1978
7. Author(s)		6.	8. Performing Organization Rept. No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
		11. Contract/Grant No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above		13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
		14.	
15. Supplementary Notes			
16. Abstracts The report contains information on the Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.			
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors USSR Military Organizations Military Facilities Military Personnel			
17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms			
17c. COSATI Field/Group 15C			
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22151		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 78
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price PCA05

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TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN MISSILE UNITS

Improved Training Methods

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Mar 78 p 2

[Text] The planned training with real targets has just begun. The crew of operators led by the officer A. Yevstigneyev are working on improving their skills in detecting, tracking, and firing on targets. This is a familiar, routine affair for these specialists. So the question automatically presents itself: to what degree will this training be effective, to what extent will these operators increase their mastery? Does this officer know how to generate in his trainees that interest without which success in training is impossible?

But now the first targets are appearing on the indicator screens; the atmosphere is immediately as if electrified, reaching a state of tension in which one has to be on the alert every instant. A bright blip from an aircraft becomes smaller, fades, and then disappears from the screens entirely. The target has to be searched for again. Only now, when time is short, does it not appear an "easy target."

So, a routine training session in which everything could proceed according to the usual plan became for the operators something entirely unexpected, something which demanded of them the utmost in the application of both thought and will. In skilfully utilizing auxiliary electronic equipment and previously thought-through tactical problems, officer Yevstigneyev was further able to insure a high level of intensity during the exercise. It proved to be interesting and instructive.

There are no few experienced methods specialists like officer Yevstigneyev in the unit [chast!]. In preparing for training sessions they conduct detailed discussions of the problems to be solved; they devise methods of supervising the activities of their specialists, and they decide how to create one critical

situation or another which could occur in actual combat. Appropriately set up for this exercise are simulators, with the aid of which can be reproduced any variety of "enemy" air attack; much use is made of tactical training problems.

The leading officers also make use of the potential hidden within the method of conducting exercises and training itself. This is achieved basically by means of the creative application of methods and procedures which are already known. Take the old, long-proven principle of instruction, "from the simple to the complex." It was formerly implemented in the following manner. A new group of specialists would first master the ABC's of the theory, and then they would be familiarized with operations involving the use of military equipment. It was only after they had familiarized themselves with their operational responsibilities that they were assigned to crews made up of experienced missilemen.

This is done differently now. Young soldiers in training act as part of organic crews from the very beginning. The sequential principle is not violated in this instance. But from the very first, the newcomers work hand in hand with their senior comrades, incorporating their experience and adjusting themselves to the rhythm of military operations.

A weighty advantage is to be derived from this method: the time required for the development of crew coordination is shortened, while the beginners' mastery of their military skills progresses at a faster rate.

Before they introduced this method, the staff performed a great amount of preparatory work. Created was a new method of organizing and conducting training in coordination, which was studied by all subunit [*podrazdeleniye*] commanders. A meeting was held for officers and warrant officers which was devoted to a discussion of the special aspects of organizing competition for the title of crew displaying the best teamwork. Demonstration exercises were held in each division.

The method of evaluating training results is also being improved. Officer A. Chebotarev once turned his attention to the fact that the crew led by Lieutenant S. Petrenko surpassed the norm in its execution of a complex operation, but it made several mistakes in the process. The crew led by Senior Lieutenant Yu. Viskov, on the other hand, executed the very same operation without a single mistake, although at a slower rate. Which of these is to be preferred? At this point there occurred the idea of evaluating training results in accordance with a formula which takes into account the mistakes which were made by the addition of "penalty" time-- the more the inaccuracies and the greater they are, the more "penalty" seconds added. This is the way it is now being done in all subunits.

It is possible that someone will say: some kind of innovation this is! Mistakes made in the execution of operations, they will say, are always taken into account one way or another.

This is true, of course. But it is one thing to take mistakes into account by eye, and another to do it in accordance with established criteria. There remains one more thing to take note of: this is demanded by life itself. For nowhere is there such an intense, gripping struggle to surpass norms as there is during training and competitions. Now in their drive for seconds some commanders neglect any stringent control over quality. This leads to operational irregularities on the part of specialists, which, as they are repeated, become increasingly ingrained. Eliminating them is not such a simple matter. The system of control introduced in the unit has made it possible sharply to reduce the number of mistakes in the operations performed by the specialists and to raise the quality of training.

Unit methods specialists conducted thorough preparations to insure that training conditions approximate as nearly as possible those of actual combat. The following incident occurred somehow during a tactical exercise. The operators had locked onto their target and should have been about to fire on it. But just at that moment communications broke down with the higher command post. The execution of the combat training mission was on the verge of being disrupted. But if everything turned out as had been planned, it was only thanks to the assistance of the more experienced officers.

After the exercise, Lieutenant V. Sabko, who was responsible for the trouble, was at a loss to explain how such a thing could have happened. But there was a simple explanation for it. The commands which the lieutenant had passed contained inaccuracies and were repeated many times, a circumstance which the "enemy" took advantage of. He intercepted the frequency on which Sabko was working and jammed it. Communications were disrupted.

This incident forced unit staff officers to think seriously about the problem of radio discipline and the accuracy with which commands are passed. Exercises and training in methods were held with commanders under conditions of heavy jamming. On the eve of each training session the staff prepared special plans.

Much is being done within the unit to improve the quality of the critiques of exercises and training. But not everything in this respect is proceeding in a satisfactory manner. In summing up results, a lieutenant may praise those who have distinguished themselves, name those who need to get themselves straightened out, and calmly bring the thing to a close. Such a critique is clearly of little benefit.

Each training session requires a thorough, detailed analysis. This makes it possible to identify the causes of the mistakes which were made. to make better plans for the next exercise, and more efficiently to organize mutual assistance among the specialists. Of course, the ability to conduct such analysis does not come to young officers of itself. For this reason the unit staff provides in its combat training plans their own exercises and assemblies for young officers.

No small amount of work has been accomplished since the beginning of the training year. But there are still unutilized potential and unresolved problems in the unit. After having discussed their tasks in connection with the letter of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the AUCCTU, and the TsK VLKSM [Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], the unit's communists have spoken stirringly and passionately on this subject at meetings. They see their duty to lie in being always and in everything in the vanguard, leading the effort to increase efficiency and quality, and achieving an upturn in all areas of the unit's activities.

Benefits of Live Firing Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Yaroshenko, Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District: "The Firing Range Makes Corrections"]

[Text] The bright, irregularly shaped spot in the center of the screen seemed to be drawing toward itself the fine arc of the target blip. After several circular sweeps of the radar it became lost in the ground clutter and dissolved among the flickering grid lines.

Captain V. Platonov turned a scrutinizing eye toward the operators: everything now depended on their mastery, endurance, and alertness. His confidence in his subordinates was not misplaced. Private V. Pavlenko quickly detected his target and began immediately to track it. Incoming data was passed on to the one in charge of the firing, officer A. Danilevich. The crew which he led operated efficiently, confidently, and quickly. The missilemen successfully accomplished their mission.

During the critique of the training session, Captain Platonov took note of the high level of training of the operators, who provided failure-free tracking of all targets. And he did not forget to mention one other item as well.

"The lesson we learned in the course of our tactical field firing exercise on the firing range did not go for naught," observed the subunit [podrazdeleniye] commander. "All specialists have drawn the proper conclusions from what occurred and have remedied the deficiencies which were identified."

The incident which Captain Platonov recalled occurred in the course of the missilemen's execution of an important mission. At a tense moment there appeared in the air maneuvering targets moving at high speed. Their blips on the screen were literally covered up by heavy interference. It was no simple matter to make out which was the target and which was the interference. One of the operators hesitated a few seconds, but the most favorable moment for firing was missed. As a result, the unit's fire capability was not fully utilized.

Officer Danilevich gave no little thought to the reasons for this failure. Yes, and the operators also went over their work, too. But these people are not the only ones governing the total amount of time expended on the execution of military command and control procedures. Attentive analysis revealed that a little later a command was passed by an officer from the command post, then there was a slight delay on the part of one specialist, and then another, until the seconds wasted began to mount up, seconds which in combat are so precious.

Hence the conclusion: some polish needs to be put on the training, not only of operators, but of specialists of other command and control components as well; each of these elements has its own potential for reducing time expenditure. In the interest of their military training, the mobilizing power of competition should be more fully utilized.

The commander and party and Komsomol activists are carefully analyzing all observations made with respect to missilemen in the course of this exercise and generalizing their own views. A conference on missile firing was held, at which were discussed the most effective combat operational procedures under conditions of a complex situation in the air and the problems involved in simulating it to the fullest extent with simulator training equipment. Corrections were made in plans for military training in the area of cooperation between individual components and within the crew as a whole. Now during training sessions operators are more frequently given problems in detecting and tracking targets flying under cover of jamming interference. With account being taken of the capabilities of present-day means of air attack, it has become more effective to employ simulation equipment. On the basis of the experience of their neighbors they have begun to run their training sessions with their errors being recorded.

The training sessions themselves are conducted after personnel have negotiated a special zone of fire and other obstacles demanding great physical endurance. Each training session is conducted in a spirit of great competitiveness.

Captain Platonov's subordinates initially fell down in their military training ratings. The higher training requirements imposed on the specialists were having their effect. But the situation gradually straightened itself out: the men are performing their operational assignments more confidently and accurately.

An atmosphere marked by the utmost in self-discipline and efficiency reigned in the command post in the course of these training sessions. A telling effect was being produced by the great mastery of methodological skills on the part of the crew leader, officer Danilevich, and his ability to evaluate a situation thoroughly; make timely, well founded decisions; and assign tasks in a clear, precise manner.

Tactical training with field firing is referred to among military personnel as a school for the mastery of military skills. And this is no accident. On the firing range missilemen acquire combat experience, conditioning, and confidence in the great fire power and reliability of their weapons. On the other hand, field firing provides the most objective indicator of the level of training reached by subunits and units and the state of their combat readiness. By analyzing the results of firing, an experienced commander discovers the pluses and minuses in his subordinates' training, including the things he himself has neglected; he draws the appropriate conclusions; and he takes effective measures to improve the quality and effectiveness of combat field training. Tactical training with field firing thus provides a unique point of reference from which to begin a new stage in the combat training of missilemen.

Unfortunately, for some commanders, training becomes, figuratively speaking, something of a routine period which comes, with relief and a letup in effort, at the end of a period of strenuous hard work on the firing range. The roar of the missile firing has died away; and now, they say, one can breathe easily and even relax a bit.... The experience they have built up and the deficiencies which have been identified do not move them to give deep thought to the problems involved in further improving the level of combat training of their subordinates. An inquiry shows that in such subunits no changes are made for the better with respect to the organization of exercises and training, just as if there had been no field firing exercises with their highly valuable lessons.

The missilemen of N-unit were to execute a complex mission in the course of their field firing. Thanks to the crews' good training, all targets were destroyed and all other training assignments successfully carried out. However, the launch personnel commanded by Major A. Avdeyev did not perform in the best possible manner. One could detect a certain constraint and lack of confidence in their handling of the missile. Analysis revealed that during the period in which they prepared for their exercise the launchers had practiced only with a training missile. When it came time for them to meet their standards with a live missile the psychological strain took its toll, and this led to poorer results.

On the firing range Major Avdeyev was advised on how he could improve his subordinates' training taking into account the recommendations of military psychology. But subsequent inquiry revealed that this advice had not been heeded and acted upon. Why?

"A live missile is more complicated to use for daily training activities than a training missile," declared Major Avdeyev.

It is indeed more complex. It requires that a number of additional measures be provided for and implemented and that technical safety rules be strictly observed. But there are problems in combat training which can be worked out only with an organic missile, and the use of a training missile instead simply does not produce the desired results. Unfortunately, Major Avdeyev does not take this into consideration.

For commanders at all levels, staffs, political workers, and engineers, the preparation and conduct of exercises involving field firing are an excellent school for the leadership of personnel; they give them practice in organizing the coordinated operations of crews, subunits, and services; and they provide the enrichment of experience for the mobilization of personnel for the accomplishment of assigned tasks under conditions approaching as nearly as possible those of actual combat. Where this is well understood firing-range experience "works" even after the completion of the tactical exercises themselves. There is the example of the performance of personnel of the antiaircraft missile regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel O. Fitkulin. At one time, the launchers in this unit as well were somewhat "afraid" of live missiles. After returning from the firing range, the staff, upon instructions from the commander, drew up a special plan providing for period testing of crews and platoons by a special group of officers. Division and battery commanders again had explained to them the procedure for conducting training exercises and exercises covering safety procedures were conducted. The experience of the best launch personnel was generalized.

The concreteness and reality of the plans which were made, the close supervision of their implementation, and the harmonious and coordinated work of the staff, the political department, and the services under the leadership of the commander made it possible quickly to eliminate the deficiencies which had been identified on the firing range and to raise the mastery of combat skills to a new, higher level.

In the analysis of the results of tactical training with field firing and the generalization of the experience thereby accumulated an important role belongs to unit staffs and methods councils. As they study special characteristics which have been identified in the training of specialists and develop specific recommendations for improving the combat training of missilemen, they thereby insure the introduction of advanced instructional techniques and the most effective tactical methods.

Upon returning from the firing range, the members of the methods council headed by Major Ye. Sdobnov conducted their many-sided, creative work. They carefully analyzed the stages of the exercise and the results achieved in each one of them; the degree of complexity of the situation created; and the performance of all crew members and crews during movement, in the course of preparing equipment for firing, and during the actual execution of firing operations.

In accordance with instructions from the regimental commander, the members of the methods council studied the experience of the best units in the district, those which had received excellent ratings on the firing range. Rationalizers developed a number of components for a simple mechanized device for the command post; constructed an effective electrified display which makes possible a visual presentation of all steps in the operations involved in field firing upon a winged target; and made improvements on organic simulator training equipment. This helped specialists at all levels more thoroughly to master their operational responsibilities and more effectively to conduct training involving the use of equipment.

We know that the value of any training measures is determined by the degree of their effect on the state of combat readiness and on the capability of units and subunits exemplarily to accomplish any mission to protect the limits of our motherland's airspace. Among these measures the introduction into practice of experience acquired on the firing range and implementation of lessons learned in the course of tactical exercises involving field firing occupy first place, for they make possible the most effective implementation of the basic military training principle: study what will be required in actual combat, what will insure military victory.

NCO Instructor Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 78 p 1

[Article by Colonel I. Maksimov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Volga Military District: "NCO Universities"]

[Text] On this day all batteries in the unit were conducting instructional methods exercises for NCO's. This is the most important way of increasing the mastery of professional skills on the part of junior commanders.

As he begins his instructor training exercise, the battery commander, Major-Engineer Yakov Anatol'yevich Chayka, formulates his goal as follows: to deepen the knowledge, reinforce the skills, and increase the mastery of methods on the part of noncommissioned officers.

Without wasting any words at the outset, he immediately introduced the junior commanders to the situation and designated the subject. The assignment was a specific, concrete one: study the physical significance of verification inspections. NCO's have not a poor knowledge of the procedures involved in each of them. The officer believes, however, that they should develop a deeper understanding of their physical significance than future operators. The better trained the NCO, the more his subordinates will know. The most complex problem will not put a knowledgeable NCO at a loss.

In bringing out the essence of each type of examination, Major-Engineer Chayka focuses the NCO's attention on the most complex case, which only with special difficulty yields to mastery. Step by step, item by item, he provides instruction in how to present material and when and how to employ visual and other training aids.

The officer studies and analyzes all problems with equal facility. He has behind him the advanced artillery engineering school. After completion of this school he worked as an instructor and so acquired pedagogical experience. This is also evident in the clear, concise manner with which he presents material and in the way he values each minute of training time. In a word, NCO's are not the only ones who could learn something from him!

First to demonstrate his readiness to provide instruction in the training facility is Senior Sergeant A. Novoselov. He went to the charts and began to explain the physical significance of the test just as though before him were soldiers who were only beginning to become familiar with the complex systems of an anti-aircraft missile complex.

Novoselov conducts his instruction well. He feels at ease and confident. Novoselov has a secondary technical education. Upon joining the army, he successfully mastered the program of his training subunit and became an operator 2d class. The battery commander was pleased with the way Novoselov gave his instruction.

Novoselov's place is taken by Sergeant V. Goncharov. But now, right at the very beginning of his lesson, there can be heard the commander's calm voice saying to the class, "Just a minute. What methodological deficiency has Sergeant Goncharov displayed?" His comrades correct the sergeant. In bringing out the physical significance of the test he forgot about the chart and the pointer. And that wasn't all. When the battery commander suggested that he be the next to give instruction, Goncharov rose but did not give his military rank and last name. A trifle? Perhaps, but there are no trifles when it comes to training and development.

Slipups of another variety were identified in the case of Junior Sergeant A. Sabel'nikov. He is a young military leader, but he knows his equipment well. When he conducts a lesson, however, he loves to clutter up his speech with superfluous words. The commander advised him as follows: "Rid yourself a little more quickly of these words that are cluttering up your speech like weeds; read more."

The second training facility is the place for practice in operational control inspections on equipment in actual operation. It is something that everyone is familiar with. However, special importance is attached to it in instructional methods training. Practical operation means the meeting of standard requirements. It is believed that an NCO should not only know how to do everything properly and quickly himself. He should also know how to organize competition among those under instruction as they perform their operational duties within their platoon or squad. The battery commander therefore did not consider it superfluous once again to give advice on how to inject elements of rivalry and competition into training exercises, how to monitor the course of competition, and to what should be devoted special attention.

At the main control desk are Senior Sergeant A. Novoselov and Sergeant A. Kantorin. Their place is taken by another pair. After them comes a third.... This is exactly how it will be in those training exercises in which these sergeants will be the leaders.

NCO instructional methods training is an object of constant attention on the part of the commander, staff officers, and political workers. The staff closely monitors adherence to the schedule of instructional methods training for junior commanders, the readiness of officers to conduct it, as well as the availability of the materials, equipment, and facilities required.

In a word, the staff strives to insure strict adherence to the principle of "The commander teaches his subordinates."

Instructional methods training is referred to within the units as the NCO university. And it appears no wonder that they have been called this. Practical experience provides convincing evidence that these exercises impart much that is useful to NCO's. And indeed, they have been of no little assistance to the subordinates of Major-Engineer Chayka. All the NCO's in the battery are rated specialists and most of them have been awarded the badge of "Outstanding Member of the Soviet Army." Successful performance of their duties on the part of NCO personnel and the daily growth of their mastery of methodological skills are inseparably connected with the success of the battery, which occupies first place in socialist competition among subunits of the unit and with confidence is fulfilling the obligations assumed during the winter training period.

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SUBMARINE COMBAT TRADITIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Guards Captain 3d Rank Yu. Gladyshev, Guards missile-carrying submarine captain: "The Flag of a Missile-Carrier"]

[Text] Every time we put to sea and the wind is blowing our Guards naval flag atop the conning tower I involuntarily turn my gaze toward it. And as I do I think about those, who, by their courage and heroism in battles for their motherland, won for their ship a high degree of military distinction, about those, the glory surrounding whose front-line service stirs and encourages us today.

I can imagine the festive animation and the joy which came to the personnel of our ship a few years ago on the day the submarine was honored with the Guards flag. The sailors resewed the ribbons on the caps, replacing them with the bright orange strips of the Guards. It was not a great change in the uniform, but one sees since then a new quality of personnel. This mechanism was devised during the Great Patriotic War when the best fighting units and ships were transformed into Guards units for exceptional service to the motherland. This mechanism is still effective today, when the best crews of our present-day ships are coming into the inheritance of the military Guards flags of their front-line predecessors.

Our missile-carrier became the successor to the Guards Red Banner submarine S-56, which became famous in action under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union Captain 2d Rank G. Shchedrin. When the S-56 was redesignated a Guards vessel its crew had to its battle credit 10 enemy ships sunk and 4 damaged.

On 22 February 1945, Admiral A. Golovko, the commander in chief of the Northern Fleet, presented the crew of the S-56 with the Guards Red-Banner Naval Flag. All personnel of the brigade participated in the ceremony of the raising of the flag. In swearing their Guards' oath to the motherland, the submariners solemnly promised that they would bear the flag always unblemished and proudly aloft.

These front line fighters proved true to their word and under difficult and trying circumstances demonstrated their loyalty to their oath and their military duty. The S-56 began its life of combat service in October 1942 off the Pacific coast. This vessel had to cross 2 oceans and 9 seas--17,000 miles--to its first encounter with the enemy. On 8 March 1943 the S-56 reached Polyarnyy, the main base of the Northern Fleet, and on 10 April the submarine's crew won its first victory. The S-56 sank an enemy transport, which broke in half from a well-placed hit; the submariners then destroyed one other enemy vessel.

When on 19 April 1943 the S-56, returning from its fighting run to Polyarnyy's Yekaterininskaya harbor, announced the results of its attacks by firing artillery rounds in the established tradition of Northern Fleet submariners, no one, of course, yet expected that this very ship would become one of the most famous. For their action in combat, four of the Navy's submarines were awarded the Guards designation and Orders of the Red Banner. Three of them, the submarines D-3, Shch-402, and the M-172, went down heroically. Only the S-56, which survived all its engagements, remained in operation.

The Guards Red Banner submarine S-56 saw service in the Northern Fleet after the war as well. And then, after completing thereby a circumnavigation of the globe that was unique in its kind, it moved over once again to the Pacific Ocean. It included the hot miles of the tropics, the frigid arctic miles, and the fiery miles of its fighting combat runs. Throughout the period of these cruises the composition of the crew was not changed a single time; rather, with respect to the most essential area, it remained unchanged--in its Guards character, in its love for the ship, its loyalty to its flag, and in its boundless devotion to the fatherland.

Many years have gone by since G. I. Shchedrin, now a retired vice-admiral, left the S-56 after having been promoted. But to this day he receives letters from his former subordinates. The hundreds, the thousands, of these letters eloquently testify to the fact that in the lives of these front-line submariners their own ship, now as before, occupies a large place.

The S-56 has made its way with lasting effect into our future as well, those members of the crew of the present-day missile-carrying submarine which has inherited the flag of this veteran ship. In accepting the flag the seamen promised not to bring disgrace to, but rather by their military accomplishments in time of peace to enhance, the glory of those front-line mariners. In these words can be heard the echo of that first Guards oath sworn by the S-56 crew back in 1945. Their Guards ribbons and insignia were then

presented to them by their comrades from the M-171, one of the first Guards submarines in the brigade. Attending the presentation of the flag to our ship were veterans of the S-56.

And today we have as guests those who did battle with the fascists in the depths of the polar seas aboard the S-56. The crew has cordially greeted the former senior Red Navy men S. Denisov and N. Nazarov; we carry on a constant correspondence with the former torpedo specialists Ya. Lempert and M. Novikov; and the crew maintains the strongest ties with the celebrated former captain of the S-56, Grigoriy Ivanovich Shchedrin.

After the war the submarine S-56 was commanded by the officer V. Kharchenko. He was the one who brought it from the North to the Pacific Ocean. Serving aboard our vessel today as a group leader is the son of Captain 2d Rank V. Kharchenko (Res), Lieu-A. Kharchenko. The continuity of generations, for which we today bear responsibility before the veterans of the S-56, and before those who have yet to serve on the missile-carrier, is to be found above all in the unstinting performance of military duties.

S-56 personnel have been outstanding specialists. Their mastery of military skills has made it possible for commanders to carry out the boldest plans. Suffice it to say that the S-56 was one of the first Soviet submarines to carry out hydroacoustic torpedo attacks without the use of the periscope, before which there proved to lie a great future. On 4 March 1944, in the region of Cape Sletnes, the submarine moved in for an attack without the use of its periscope and destroyed an enemy transport.

Last year our vessel was assigned many cruises. Most of them took it through stormy seas and difficult conditions. The difficulties were compounded by the fact that a considerable number of crew members were aboard the vessel for the first time. But the submariners nevertheless accomplished all their tasks successfully, and the ship was declared the best in the unit [chast']. The missilemen won special praise. They successfully mastered a new tactical method for employing their weapons, and their skillful operation during the firing competition insured that the ship won the Navy prize for fire and tactical training.

These were only one year's achievements. Crew members of this outstanding missile-carrier have long had every right to speak as well of the traditions which have developed on their ship, which find their origin in the development of those combat traditions in which the S-56 has distinguished itself. Our submarine has several times come out as the initiator of socialist competition in the unit; it has for long justified its title of "outstanding" ship, and the crew has been awarded the challenge

banner of the fleet military council. But the most remarkable thing is that in the course of the ship's entire history there has never been an instance of missile firings being accomplished with a rating below "excellent." This tradition of a high level of mastery of military skills which has been inherited from the front-line generation of submariners is being firmly and steadfastly adhered to be the seamen of the present generation.

The missile-carrier's crew has taken as a specific program of military activities the Letter of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the AUCCTU, and the CC VLKSM [Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth] dealing with the development of socialist competition during 1978. The high obligations which were assumed with the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces in view have been successfully fulfilled. Basing themselves on past experience, these submariners are today striving to perform better than they did yesterday, and tomorrow better than they are today.

Among the characteristic attributes displayed by the crew of the S-56 have been its cohesiveness and solidarity, its strong bonds of friendship, and the mutual aid and assistance rendered one another in the naval spirit. These have helped the submariners emerge the victors from difficult circumstances, always to have faith in ultimate victory, and invariably to prevail against the enemy.

The S-56 was once forced to break off its pursuit for approximately 24 hours. The enemy had dropped more than 300 depth charges on the submarine. With each passing hour it became increasingly difficult to breathe, for the air in the compartments was becoming saturated with carbon dioxide. Personnel were immobilized by fatigue. The captain then announced that he was permitting nonparty personnel to rest, but that he was requesting communists to remain on duty. From the compartments came back the declarations: "We have no nonparty personnel. We will stand our watch."

The party organization aboard our ship, which is headed by Guards Captain-Lieutenant S. Chernyavskiy, comprises one-third of the crew members. But our communists are strong not only in their number. The authority of each one of them is a resource of the entire unit and a source of general pride. Enjoying a reputation for a high level of professional mastery are Guards Captain 2d Rank-Engineer G. Dorozhko, holder of the order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3d Degree, and Guards Captains 3d Rank V. Vasilishin and M. Rayskiy. Diligently and purposefully launching out on their careers are the young officers S. Dergunov, N. Dryakhlov, and V. Smirnov.

We initiate young crew members into the Guards when we put to sea and always in a festive atmosphere of celebration. On those days we all, together with the new crew members, experience the moving moments when we turn to the glorious past of Soviet submariners, moments of pride in our mighty ocean-going navy of today, which highly honors the revolutionary and military traditions of Soviet seamen.

The next time we put to sea we should turn our thoughts to the S-56 (on 9 May 1975 the celebrated submarine was set up on the pier at Vladivostok, on a pedestal of eternal glory). It is having a well-earned rest. But in the flag of the missile carrier, blown by the winds of the 1970's, the military spirit of the S-56 lives on. And in this way it continues with us to serve the motherland.

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METHODS OF IMPROVING SOCIALIST COMPETITION DISCUSSED

Tank Division Commander

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Guards Colonel Yu. Vodolazov, Commander of the Voluntary Ural'sko-L'vovskaya Guards Tank Division imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Not Only Seconds"]

[Text] My reflections on the letter from Captain V. Shchekotov took me back to the time when I was a young commander, when I myself, like the writer, commanded a tank company. Not everything, especially in the first months, went as it should have; and it was by no means every day that, summing up results, I was pleased with the results of my own work. But even now, years later, I still recall that period as a remarkable one. How many interesting, heated discussions there were among us as young officers on the subject of ways to increase the effectiveness of training exercises and the efficacy of competition!

On one hand, it is really, generally speaking, no very difficult matter to organize competition during training exercises and generate a spirit of rivalry in the course of working out assignments in one area or another. The criteria for evaluation are clearly and specifically set forth; the standards are well known; and the commander always has his stopwatch near at hand. You record the times, count the hits, and post the ratings. You compare and then draw your conclusions.

On the other hand, to organize competition which helps military personnel bring out all their best attributes and improve themselves morally in the course of the performance of their military duties is really a difficult problem. Because competition is not simply a battle for seconds, an effort to surpass one standard or another, or a rivalry in facility and skill. For can every expert gunner and skilled driver-mechanic be a leader in competition. Can a commander not but take into consideration the moral-

political attributes of his subordinate, the efficiency with which he performs his duties, his attitude toward his comrades-in-arms, his authority within his unit?

I support those officers who, in their effort to generate the greatest spirit of competition in the course of training exercises, search for the most graphic, the most objective methods of evaluating achievements and employ a variety of graphs, comparison charts, etc. But in this regard I usually remind them that competition is not only ratings and points, that they also must keep in mind the moral, developmental aspect of the matter. A commander isn't in the business of raising "record breakers." He should achieve a uniform, high level of training of all specialists without exception.

The more fully the moral aspect is taken into consideration in evaluating the results of each member, the greater will be the effectiveness of socialist competition within the unit. Evidence of this is provided, for example, by the experience of one of our best tank battalions. It is commanded by Guards Major B. Shkolovoy. In this unit, in evaluating a soldier's achievements, all aspects of his conduct are taken into account. Along with the officers, tank commanders and Komsomol group organizers express their opinion of the person involved.

And now we come to the question asked in his letter by Captain V. Shchekotov: how, specifically, does one take into account the factor of discipline in the process of summing up results? My answer is as follows: one doesn't need to summon mathematics for assistance. Some young commanders sometimes attempt to resort to a point system even in this area. I am sure that this is of no use. A person's level of consciousness cannot be expressed by a figure. And what is more, there is no need for it anyway. What is important is that in the process of determining the effectiveness of competition there be kept in the forefront the matters of the military teamwork within the subunit, the cohesion among subunit personnel, and military comradeship and friendship. For the seconds saved in one area or another, or successful firing, are a questionable success if within the subunit there are established no truly communist mutual relationships among personnel, if regulation procedures are not adhered to, and if there are not maintained a businesslike atmosphere and the utmost efficiency in performance.

Like any other commander, I am delighted by reports of high ratings achieved, say, on the firing range or the tank training ground. This indicates that things were managed in exemplary fashion and that during the training exercise there reigned a spirit of competition and military rivalry. But other victories in competition bring no less satisfaction.

I will tell about one of them. The companies commanded by Senior Lieutenants N. Surop and A. Borubayev had long been in competition with one another. Surop's men invariably came out ahead. But then during a recent summing up of results it turned out that coming out ahead for the first time was the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant Borubayev. Had it come about that the constant leaders had given up their position?

No, their achievements were at a high level as before. The reason lay elsewhere. Formerly, Senior Lieutenant Surop's NCO's had performed considerably more effectively than those in neighboring units. When he observed how Borubayev was working with his junior commanders he spotted some deficiencies and offered his help. They decided, among other things, to organize a meeting between the NCO's of both subunits for an exchange of experience. The discussion proved to be useful and instructive. Some other joint measures were taken involving an exchange of experience. In time, as I have already mentioned, the company ratings evened out, there even occurring a change in leaders. In my view, in this fact of mutual assistance there was clearly demonstrated the inexhaustible moral force of competition.

In a word, my advice to Captain V. Shchekotov is that in summing up results he evaluate the achievement of a subunit as though it were an individual person, and this must be done in a comprehensive manner. It should never be forgotten that the primary criterion by which to judge the effectiveness of socialist competition is its influence on the enhancement of the moral-political attributes of military personnel, the degree to which it instills in them a communist attitude toward labor, and its development in them of an active view of life.

Regimental Chief of Staff

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Regimental Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel V. Verkhoshapov: "School of Efficiency"]

[Text] I am following the discussion of Captain V. Shchekotov's letter with great interest. I have noticed that several comrades view the matter of the effectiveness of competition on something like the following plane: the greater the spirit of rivalry in the course of training exercises, the greater the effectiveness of the competition. Nor can I myself imagine competition without a spirit of rivalry. But what are important are the conditions under which it develops and the degree to which it meets the requirements of an advanced method of organizing training exercises.

I often have occasion to attend training exercises held in sub-units [podrazdeleniye] of the unit [chast'7]. In practice I was convinced, for example, that Senior Lieutenant A. Lapa and Lieutenant A. Shevelev are capable of organizing training exercises so that there prevails a spirit of rivalry and that, generally speaking, good ratings are achieved. But by and large, the sub-units commanded by these officers are not pleased with their success. Why?

It is because training plans and schedules have yet to become law here and no little time is lost as a result of lack of organization or inefficiency on the part of one component or another. In other words, because of the inability of these young officers to accomplish with a uniformly high degree of efficiency all the diverse tasks facing their units' military personnel.

When we speak of socialist competition as an integral part of the training process, we have in mind not only a spirit of rivalry during training exercises. It is necessary to insure that the planned exercises begin at the designated time, that all trainees are present, etc. Can a high level of activity on the part of personnel really compensate for deficiencies, say, in training equipment and facilities? The translation of the upsurge of patriotic enthusiasm on the part of military personnel and their military inspiration into concrete achievements requires the appropriate organization of activities.

The letter of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the AUCCTU, and the TsK VLKSM [Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] contains a highly persuasive declaration with regard to the development of socialist competition in 1978. I have in mind the point at which is emphasized the great role in the improvement of the organization of production and labor played by brigade leaders, foremen, and section and shift supervisors. If we take the special features of army conditions into consideration, we can say that in our case, too, the effectiveness of competition depends to a decisive degree on squad and platoon leaders and company commanders and the extent to which units and subunits adhere firmly to regulation procedures and training plans and programs.

I am deeply convinced that competition serves not only to inspire everyone to creative endeavor and a wide-ranging display of initiative, but it also provides a true school of efficiency. The platoon leader has to concern himself with seeing that the tasks in each area are accomplished in a spirit of military rivalry, the service chief that the training leader has a thorough knowledge of the subject under study, the operator of one piece of equipment or another that it operate reliably.... The drive to achieve a high level of effectiveness of competition requires the combined efforts of one and all.

At official conferences we often use the example of Captain O. Zhitkov. The company he commands is a leader in competition. One can find more than one subunit commander in the regiment who can conduct training exercises every bit as well as Captain Zhitkov. What are the qualities which distinguish Comrade Zhitkov? What is it that explains the constant success of his subunit? Above all, efficiency and consistency in the accomplishment of all tasks.

In his letter Captain V. Shchekotov asks the following question: how does one generate a spirit of competition during movement? It is, of course, entirely in order that he should ask this question. But it is also important to give thought to another one: what can be done during movement such that the situation approximates as nearly as possible actual combat conditions, such that none of the men feels like he is simply a passenger. I have noted more than once that it is this above all which concerns Captain Zhitkov. Because where personnel are surmounting the difficulties proceeding from the nature of modern-day warfare is to be found the basis for conducting the battle for seconds and for efficient employment of equipment and weapon capabilities.

In my view, the ability to organize competition is an integral part of overall command know-how in the broadest sense of this term. A high level of effectiveness can be achieved for competition only by that officer who is alert and responsive to all new developments and who in small things as well as great strives to master the style of work taught us by the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

Deputy Commander of a Motorized Infantry Division

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Chechevatov, Deputy Commander of the Rogachevskaya Guards Motorized Infantry Division imeni Supreme Soviet of the BSSR: "Regimental Horizons"]

[Text] Competition demands creative endeavor, forms and methods constantly updated, and constant analysis and generalization of accumulated experience. It is impossible not to agree with this idea, which was expressed by Captain V. Shchekotov. It is equally appropriate whether we are speaking of competition between individual soldiers, crews, or detachments, or of competition between regiments.

In the course of the "Berezina" exercise I had occasion to witness the following episode. An officer from a unit operating in

the vicinity came to the headquarters of the motorized guards infantry regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel G. Gurin. The regiments were competing against each other. The visitor had come to find out how his neighbors were going about the accomplishment of their assigned mission and to borrow a crumb of experience. Observing him take down in his notebook data, for the purpose of obtaining which he had covered kilometers of snow-covered countryside, I involuntarily recalled another incident.

Battalions of various regiments were conducting field firing exercises on parallel sectors of a directrix. Things were not going too badly for Guards Captain N. Muzychenko and Captain M. Semashko. From them this was to be expected, for their battalions were leaders in the competition in their regiments. But I noticed that a number of problems connected with the organization of training exercises and the maintenance during them of a competitive spirit were being resolved in different ways in different subunits. I offered the conclusion that comparison and an exchange of experience would be helpful to both officers. I shared these ideas with Captain Semashko. They came as something of a surprise to him. He said something to the effect that what happens in that regiment is their business and what goes on in our regiment is ours. To go, he said, to a neighbor for information based on his experience was something he would rather not do.

It will already be clear to readers that this incident on the firing range occurred during the period when competition did not extend beyond the framework of a regiment. I do not think one would hear such an argument today. Expansion of the boundaries of competition has heightened the mutual interest of officers of different units in one another's experience and knowledge and has had a beneficial effect on their effectiveness.

Competition between units is a relatively recent development, one that is gathering strength. The time for in-depth generalizations and conclusions lies ahead. But much is already clear today. There can be no doubt, for example, that the barrier separating regiments in the area of competition has been surmounted. Increasingly apparent has been the effort of units to borrow proven methods of instruction and training and of strengthening discipline and order. One can observe many incidents like the one that attracted my attention in the course of "Berezina."

Competition between regiments has opened up new horizons. Regiments contain, for example, subunits which have no others within their units with which to compete because they are the sole representatives of a certain type of weapon. After entering into competition in military activities with similar subunits of other regiments in the division and lining up strict, principled judges in the person of divisional officers, they began more

efficiently and effectively to work out solutions to many problems. The spirit of competition in military training among antiaircraft gunners, antitank personnel, communications specialists, field engineers, and troops of many other specialties has produced a positive effect on the level of their training. The level of activity surrounding competition has also increased among personnel in the mass-scale specialties: gunner-operators, driver-mechanics, etc. Regular comparison of the performance ratings for the subunits of various units participating together in the same exercise has injected new life into competition; it has raised in sharper form the matter of the honor of a military unit; and it has added great emotional intensity to the battle for first place.

Our division did formerly devote a great deal of attention to publicizing and introducing into practice advanced knowledge and experience. But all these measures taken previously--we see them now from other points of view--were, as a rule, of an internal, regimental nature. It turned out, figuratively speaking, that the regiments stewed in their own juice. The praise meted out in one direction on the one hand, or blame, on the other, which were to be heard in official divisional meetings and which were supported by neither specific figures nor comparisons, produced virtually no change in the situation.

For command personnel, the political section, and the divisional staff, competition between regiments has become a key with which to open up the way to a more intensive exchange of knowledge and experience and formed the basis for a more principled evaluation of achievements. New, progressive developments emerging in one regiment or another quickly become a resource at the disposal of all. Recently recommended to the division's officers, for example, was the experience in organizing tactical training accumulated in the battalion commanded by Guards Captain A. Safronov. Everyone took advantage of these recommendations without delay.

Competition is bringing regiments together in many areas. Unit staffs have begun more often to combine their efforts in planning military training, in searching for the best ways to accomplish the most important sections of the program, and in the matter of experimentally testing one instructional method or another. We can say that the front along which the search is being conducted has been extended and creative energy more efficiently employed.

But it still appears to me that the new possibilities opened up to us by inter-regimental competition are not yet being exploited to the fullest extent. Combined technical conferences, joint meetings of the party and Komsomol committees of the competing regiments devoted to the discussion of certain results of competition, general meetings of unit representatives, meetings between

officers, demonstration exercises.... With their skillful employment during the year, these and other forms could impart to competition a new impetus and enhance it's effect on all aspects of the life of both the regiments and the division.

Inter-regimental competition is inseparably connected with advancement toward the title of leading unit [soyedineniye] in it's service of the Armed Forces. It is impossible to fill this advance with a concrete content without continually evaluating the contribution to the common cause made by each regiment and without bringing those furthest behind up to the level of those in the lead. Based on the results of the past training year, our division was awarded the Red Challenge Banner of the Ground Forces' military council. We see our task to lie in keeping the leading-unit title, in advancing further, and in achieving greater things. This goal is a force for mobilization for the search for increasing the effectiveness of inter-regimental competition, for bringing the entire formation into line, and for orienting everyone toward the maximum result.

Comments on Letters

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 78 p 2

[Article: "A Good Word from the Commander"]

[Text] Many readers who respond to the letter from Captain V. Shchekotov emphasize the importance of the skillful utilization in socialist competition of various forms of moral and material incentives for the leaders.

"My father," writes Guards Sergeant G. Silin, "keeps among his orders and medals a commendation from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I recently acquired an even better understanding of the value of these documents. The commander presented me with a letter of commendation for winning the competition for driver-mechanics. This letter will always serve as a reminder of a very difficult but interesting day."

Everyone who has participated in the discussion of the letter of Captain V. Shchekotov has dealt to one degree or another with the matters of moral and material incentives for competition winners and the development in personnel of pride in the successes of their own subunit, unit, ship, or formation [soyedineniye].

Sharing his thoughts with us, battalion commander Major A. Lasevich writes that "much depends on an officer's ability to take note of a subordinate's efforts and to provide him with support and incentive. It is by no means always necessary for a commander

publicly to announce his commendations and awards for those with outstanding ratings. One can provide encouragement and inspire confidence with a good word and attention on the part of the commander as well."

Ship department commander Senior Lieutenant A. Potapov is of the same opinion. Sharing his experience in organizing socialist competition during a long cruise, he writes that he worked out performance results every day, unfailingly taking note of those with the best ratings, sometimes with a commendation and sometimes simply with some warm words. "By the end of the cruise," declares the officer, "our department had won an 'excellent' rating. One of the reasons for this success lay in the fact that each man was being observed, that he knew that his effort, his contribution to the common cause would be evaluated and duly noted."

In the view of our readers, life itself confirms the effectiveness of many forms of moral incentive which originate in the course of competition. This includes the awarding of the leading military units with Red Challenge Banners, prizes, and pennants. Established in many units has become the ritual of raising a flag in honor of the company or battery which, by the month's results, is the leader in competition. Captain Yu. Frolov says that for competition winners in his unit are organized trips to historical sites and visits to museums. Lieutenant V. Mineyev reports that in his unit the sections with "outstanding" ratings are photographed and a photo certified by the commander presented to each man.

Pictures of the leaders in the unit area and Lenin rooms; evening gatherings in honor of competition winners; letters of commendation to the family, the school, the enterprise, or the kolkhoz, from which the youth was called up.... Writing of the great educational effect of these and many other means of providing moral incentive are Lieutenants A. Kolychev and A. Kirpichnikov, Captain Z. Gogrichiani, Captain 3d Rank V. Pshenichnyy, Major M. Konoplyanik, and other comrades.

Are moral incentives always handled as required by the regulations? Unfortunately not. "Back in May of last year," writes Captain B. Kas'yanov from the Carpathian Military District, "Private N. Dmitruk was given an incentive award of a short leave for his success in competition. But so far the leave itself has not come through. Many weeks ago it was announced that a letter of commendation would be sent to the parents of Privates P. Pilyuta and M. Godovanyuk, who had distinguished themselves during an exercise. But it was not sent. Is it necessary to say that instances of neglect such as these are reflected in the effectiveness of competition?"

Readers are complaining that medals are sometimes presented only after prolonged delays and expressing the thought that it would be to advantage to centralize the production of the pennants to be awarded to the best squads and platoons.

Even the fine points are of no small importance when we speak of the frame of mind on the part of personnel and moral incentives. Readers are of one mind on this. The ability of a commander to provide incentive awards for the leaders and to evaluate objectively the contribution of each of his subordinates to the common effort is an indispensable condition for a high level of effectiveness of competition.

Sredin's Remarks

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 78 p 2

[Article by Colonel General G. Sredin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces: "Increase the Effectiveness of Competition"]

[Text] Soviet military personnel are actively participating in the nationwide socialist competition in implementing the historic decisions of the 25 Congress of the CPSU and persistently improving their mastery of military skills and their readiness to deal an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. The participation in competition of all categories of personnel reflects the important regularity of social development in a socialist army, the democratism of our Armed Forces, and their inseparable unity with the people. Competition influences all aspects of the life of the armed forces: it contributes to the mastery in a short period of time of the latest equipment and weapons and is a great factor in raising the level of political and work activity of military personnel and in their training in a spirit of collectivism, comradely mutual assistance, and discipline. It generates in each one a sense of personal participation in accomplishing tasks of state importance in increasing the country's defensive capability and the combat strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.

As pointed out by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU and Minister of Defense of the USSR in his report "Sixty Years On Guard Over the Achievements of the Great October", an increased role for socialist competition in the effort to achieve a high level of effectiveness and quality in training and educational work among both the ground forces and naval personnel and in maintaining them in a constant state of combat readiness will follow from the growing complexity of the tasks facing personnel. Today much depends on the ability of commanders, political organs, staff personnel, and party and Komsomol organizations to utilize the mobilizing

force of competition for the purpose of raising the level of the social activity of the troops, developing their initiative, and creating an atmosphere of practical, businesslike competition in the course of instruction, training, and exercises.

The organization of socialist competition in a subunit, a unit, or on a ship and process of providing it with daily direction requires knowledge and experience. The great interest generated among readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by the letter from tank company commander Captain V. Shchekotov, "How Can We Increase the Effectiveness of Competition?", is to be explained above all by the fact that there is always alive among military personnel a desire to obtain a thorough knowledge of advanced experience and to employ it for the successful accomplishment of tasks in the area of military training and education.

Taking part in the general discussion in the pages of the newspaper have been commanders, political workers, staff officers, party and Komsomol organizations, personnel of all services of the Armed Forces. The discussion has proved to be businesslike and interesting. Of special value, as it turned out, has been the fact that the readers' attention has been focused on accomplishment of the tasks set in the letter of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the AUCCTU, and the CC VLKSM [Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] on the development of socialist competition in 1978. It contains no small number of specific suggestions. Their adoption will help commanders and political workers improve the organization of socialist competition, contribute to increasing its effectiveness, and make it possible more fully to utilize available resources in the campaign by units and ships to fulfill the obligations they have assumed.

In their responses to the letter from Captain V. Shchekotov readers have emphasized the unique features of competition under present-day conditions. During this anniversary year for the Armed Forces it is, as we know, proceeding under the slogan "Be trustworthy in defense of the socialist fatherland; be in constant combat readiness; be persistent in efforts to master the use of weapons and equipment; improve mastery of military skills." So, competition is directed toward the highly efficient accomplishment of the main tasks facing the armed forces.

As the most important gauge of the strength of the Armed Forces, combat readiness depends to a great extent on the degree of mastery on the part of personnel of new weapons; their ability to operate skillfully the most complex military vehicles, missile complexes, supersonic aircraft, nuclear submarines, and radio-electronic systems; and on their capacity to exploit these to the maximum extent in warfare. The maintenance of units and

ships in a constant state of combat readiness therefore requires on the part of personnel great intensity of effort, selflessness during training, and a creative attitude toward their work.

What socialist competition does is precisely to assist in the mobilization of personnel for intensive training; it keeps them constantly oriented toward the achievement of high ratings in military training and duty performance; and it teaches them to view even the highest rating as only a step forward, as the basis for an advance to new levels of achievement. On the practical level, competition in the achievement of a high degree of combat readiness entails a day-by-day, year-by-year effort to achieve excellent ratings in all exercises and to surpass established standards, those already achieved. This active effort on the part of the unit as a whole, as well as of each member individually, to achieve the highest ratings is inconceivable without comradely rivalry in military and political training, without competition in the course of accomplishing the tasks in each area of training and each training problem, or without an organic connection between competition and the entire educational-training process.

How, then, is an atmosphere of military rivalry, healthy competition, during instruction, training, and exercises to be created? This was the question asked in his letter by Captain V. Shchekotov, and he received answers from many readers. Interesting ideas were shared with us, for example, by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Krasil'nikov, Major B. Stashko, Senior Lieutenant V. Polbin and other comrades.

In analyzing their experience of competition in subunits composed of various types of weapons they have come to the same conclusion: a competitive spirit is sparked in those units where the training leader devotes attention to each trainee, objectively and comprehensively evaluates the results of his performance, compares them with the achievements of his comrades-in-arms, and suggests ways to improve further the level of training. The competitive spirit is especially clearly demonstrated in socialist competition in the accomplishment of missions and efforts to achieve standard performance ratings, the most active and concrete form of competition, the organization of which is becoming increasingly widespread each year in field exercises, firing, and launchings, and in the accomplishment of flight missions, naval cruises, and during training sessions. Readers point out that where competition is organized properly and in a practical, businesslike manner in the areas of training and the achievement of standard performance ratings, one can sense the high level of tension from the moment obligations are assumed until the calculation of final competition results.

During the discussion of the letter many officers have shared with us their experience in organizing competition under the dynamic conditions of field exercises, flight missions, and naval cruises. This experience, of course, must be adopted for one's own use in a creative manner, taking into account the individual characteristics of one's own subunit, the level of preparedness of one's subordinates, and the available training equipment and facilities. It is important always to explain clearly and understandably to personnel the role of each military training measure in the effort to increase the subunit's combat readiness and the troops' mastery of military skills; to precede training sessions with careful planning and to determine clearly those assignments, the accomplishment of which should involve the development of a spirit of competition; and to provide fuller details of the situation prior to going out into the field, etc.

To insure that competition actually becomes an integral part of the training and educational process is no simple matter. It is impossible not to agree with the readers' view that it is the duty of senior, more experienced comrades to teach young officers the art of organizing competition, for it is precisely the latter who are immediately involved in conducting the greatest part of the training of personnel. This training of the younger officers should proceed under objective circumstances, actually on the job. The possibilities here are endless: suggestions and advice offered in the course of methodological instruction and critiques of training sessions which have been conducted; skillful organization of competition in demonstration exercises, publicizing the experience of the leading methods specialists, discussion of the problems of competition at different types of gatherings, official conferences, officers' meetings. Lieutenant Colonel V. Verkhoshapov, Captain V. Nikolayev and other comrades have related in the pages of this newspaper how commanders, political organs, and staffs are making use of these possibilities. The paper has also devoted due attention to the relationship of party organizations to this important matter. It is important to develop a thorough understanding of all these things and put them to use in a creative manner in the course of one's daily work.

I would like to lend my support to those readers who have spoken of the role of the officer in competition, both as organizer and leader and as participant having his own personal responsibilities. The effort to master the use of equipment, to achieve a high proficiency rating and to expand one's knowledge of tactics and participation in military-scientific efforts to improve efficiency and in the sports activities of the unit or ship contribute effectively to the professional development of an officer. By participating in competition he grows more

quickly as both military specialist and commander, the organizer of the instruction and training of his subordinates. Competition also contributes to increasing an officer's social activity and to the formation within him of an attitude inclining him to active participation in official and other matters.

A good school for young officers has become the organization of competition between platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, and ships, as well as at the level of large unit (soyedineniye) and district, for the title of best subunit.

A number of responses have spoken of the nature of the obligations assumed by personnel. It is, of course, an important matter. "It is impossible to achieve a high degree of effectiveness of competition," one of these letters rightly points out, "if the goals set for it are sufficiently well-defined and well-founded." In the meantime, individual obligations are still not always well thought out and realistic, while not everywhere is there insured the active participation of all military personnel in the fulfillment of unit obligations. Some staffs have yet to find their place in the work to be done in this area.

Lieutenant Colonel-Engineer A. Belokopytov and Major V. Smirnov have come out in favor of group discussions of obligations assumed by individuals and of having each individual defend the obligations he has assumed before the other members of his unit. The discussion of obligations could, of course, be organized in different ways. The only important thing, though, is to insure that they are given full consideration by the group as a whole, that they are well-defined and realistic, and that they demand highly intensive efforts during the course of training.

The share of the obligations assumed by the troops has another purpose as well: to make of them achievers of "excellent" ratings in training, rated sportsmen, and specialists with high proficiency ratings, to put their subunit among the ranks of those achieving excellent ratings, etc. There is also justification to be found for the assumption of specific individual obligations in the course of the execution of training missions or assignments; for example: destroying a target with the first round, launch, or pass; surpassing one norm or another; fulfilling in an exemplary manner one's responsibilities in the performance of military duties and guard and other routine unit duties; performing first-rate routine maintenance; accomplishing tasks with an incomplete crew, and others. Obligations of this nature give competition a more dynamic character. Readers have illustrated this with vivid examples from actual experience. It appears that all of these things are finding increasingly widespread application in practical work.

Almost all responses to Captain V. Shchekotov's letter touched in one way or another on the moral-ethical aspect of competition and its effect on the strengthening of discipline, the development of cohesion and a spirit of unity within military units, and the enhancement in them of an atmosphere of true military comradeship and friendship. In fuller utilization of the educational-developmental function of competition readers see a most important resource to be employed to increase its effectiveness. This is natural. In competition we see displayed the finest moral-political attributes of our troops, their devotion to the cause of the party, their deep understanding of their constitutional duty, their ardent patriotism, their high level of social activity.

Competition is a powerful means of personal spiritual enrichment. Its effectiveness is to be evaluated not only in terms of points, seconds, or concrete material indicators. In calculating competition ratings, it is also necessary to consider the effectiveness of its moral influence on military personnel and the expansion of their political and cultural horizons and the effect which it has on the strengthening of discipline, organization, and order. The essentials of this type of overall evaluation have been well covered in the pages of this newspaper by division commander Guards Colonel Yu. Vodolazov. Instructive, real-life situations were analyzed in the responses from Major M. Berezhnnyy, Lieutenant V. L'vov, and other officers. They find agreement in the view that the battle for seconds and the effort to surpass one norm or another do not lead to solid success, to true victory, if they do not bring with them a moral improvement of personnel and if the burst of military enthusiasm on their part is not permeated with conscious initiative and deep understanding of the social significance of their everyday activities.

Readers have convincingly pointed to what they see as the moral sources of the effort to achieve first place in competition. These sources are to be found in the desire of each person to make the maximum personal contribution to the common cause and to uphold the honor of his subunit, unit, or ship. Competition in combat training, military rivalry, is a special form of expression of collectivism in military work.

It is impossible not to agree with those readers (Guards Major A. Yas'kov, Major A. Lasevich and others) who have written of the importance of the skillful employment of moral incentives. The educational, developmental role played by competition is always greater where the best use is made of a variety of moral and material incentives for competition leaders, where within personnel is generated a pride in the successes of his subunit, unit, ship, or large unit and an intolerance of deficiencies, complacency, and arrogance. Unfortunately, this is not always taken into account, a shortcoming which leads to a lessening of the effectiveness of competition.

The end of the winter training period is drawing near. Intensive training is underway in units and on ships; the tension of the socialist competition grows from day to day. To an ever increasing extent we see being realized here the party's demand that we not rest content with what we have achieved, that we not be taken in by our successes. As a guide to action our military cadres have taken the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "Perform better today than yesterday, and tomorrow better than today.... And better means an emphasis on quality and effectiveness." The increased creative activity on the part of personnel and the desire to move ahead and achieve greater things also finds its expression in the development and growth within the Armed Forces of a movement for the position of leading large unit and for the best group of forces and the best military district.

There is no doubt but that in a further increase in the effectiveness of socialist competition a positive role will be played by the discussion of the problems involved in competition which has been presented in the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The large readership has acquired valuable bits of experience and information; new developments which have recently enriched competition have been analyzed; and attention has been devoted to those things which hinder the effort to fulfill the great socialist obligations assumed by military personnel in the Armed Forces anniversary year of 1978. Pointed out among other things has been the fact that there are still to be found elements of formalism, that a high level of exactingness and strictness is not always apparent in the process of calculating the results of competition, and that sometimes military training tasks are accomplished and norms achieved under simplified conditions, with the high ratings thereby obtained accepted as true indicators of the degree of the mastery of military skills on the part of subunits and units.

In calculating the results of the winter training period it is necessary as thoroughly as possible to analyze the organization of competition in each subunit; to evaluate objectively its effect on the raising of those qualitative indicators which reflect the level of combat readiness, of the field, air, and naval training of, and the degree of teamwork and cooperation within, a military unit and on the improvement of regulation order and discipline; and to account for and bring into play all unutilized resources.

Our task lies in injecting a greater element of efficiency into competition and in being more demanding in the process of evaluating its results. It is the duty of commanders, staffs, political organs, and party organizations continually to improve the organization of competition and the style of leadership of those in charge of it at all levels. The ability to make effective use of mass-scale initiative, to inspire personnel for the effort to achieve maximum ratings, to make full use of the educative

function of competition, and to create all conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by personnel--these are signs of maturity on the part of military cadres, as well as of their organizing ability. An example of principledness and persistence in the effort to increase the effectiveness of competition should be provided by the communists in the armed forces, who are leading the campaign to implement the decisions of the 25th Party Congress and the December Plenum of the CC CPSU.

The discussion of Captain V. Shchekotov's letter proceeded in the nature of a frank exchange of views. Such a lively comparison of forms and methods of organizational work will help officers, warrant officers (praporshchiki, michmany), sergeants, and petty officers, all who are involved in the organization of competition, the better in the coming months of intensive military training to carry on the search for more effective ways to utilize its mobilizing role and enhance its effect on the maintenance of a constant state of combat readiness, on the strengthening of discipline and the improvement of organization, and on the exemplary accomplishment of the complex and critical tasks the party has given the Armed Forces.

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CSO: 1801

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DAMAGE CONTROL TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Captain 2d Rank N. Korniyenko, senior instructor of the Leningrad Naval Engineering School imeni V. I. Lenin: "The Psychology of Training, Notes on Damage Control Training for Naval Personnel"]

[Text] Powerful blasts of water beat against the bulkheads, while dense water spray filled the damage-control compartment. It is dark. After giving all necessary commands, Senior Seaman A. Mironyuk throws himself into accomplishing initial damage-control measures. Hurrying to help him comes Seaman V. Baranov. One after another the signal lights light up, indicating the rising water level. And the more closely I follow these seamen's activity, the more clearly there appears the purposeless fuss and commotion in what some of them are doing.

The water level had reached the critical point, and without individual protective means it had now become impossible to continue damage-control measures.

During the training they received immediately prior to this, the work of these seamen appeared to be performed more confidently. But at that point their training had been conducted under highly simplified conditions: in broad daylight and without the complicating factors introduced into training situations.

In deciding to conduct training under more difficult conditions, Captain 3d Rank-Engineer B. Martynov, head of the engineering department, realized that the seamen could make some mistakes. But he could not have known that Senior Seamen B. Tertychnyy and N. Voropayev, both of them considered experienced specialists, would become confused and not play an active role in the work.

After careful analysis, Captain 3d Rank-Engineer came to the following conclusion: it would be necessary to devote more attention to the psychological preparation of personnel for each training exercise. This would make it possible to avoid such disruptions and failures in the future.

It is, indeed, precisely the psychological unpreparedness of individual seamen for unexpected changes in a situation which was the cause of their failure. For his part, Senior Seaman Mironyuk was psychologically unprepared to combine two types of activities differing in their nature: the effort to solve the water problem itself and the direction of the activities of his subordinates.

Keeping records of individual capabilities in the course of training exercises is an indispensable condition for increasing the effectiveness of the training process and the quality of the training which personnel receive. This becomes of special importance in critical situations. Accumulated shipboard experience indicates that in order to achieve positive training results it is necessary thoroughly to think through the dynamics of the change in a situation in a compartment or at a battle station and the list of training test situations, to prepare and spur personnel on to successful accomplishment of their tasks, and to equip them with knowledge and skills.

But however necessary these conditions are, they are by no means sufficient in themselves. It is no less important to create the appropriate emotional background. A leader has to understand that training exercises are not only a method of instruction, but also a means of developing and adapting the body and mind of a trainee to the rapidly changing, increasingly complex conditions of a situation. In planning a training exercise it is necessary to consider not only its technical and physical, but also its psychological, dynamics; to formulate not only a practical goal (the ability to work with beam and wedges), but an emotional one as well--to achieve a force and steadfastness of habit under conditions fraught with such powerful psychological irritants as darkness, difficulty in breathing, and the large number of training test situations.

The basis for this planning lies in a commander's precise knowledge of the level of development in his subordinates of those psychological attributes which are decisive in a given specific situation. In the process of working out damage-control problems, for example, an experienced leader takes into consideration the rapidity and accuracy with which a seamen orients himself, his ability to think critically, the sureness and ease with which he shifts his attention from one object to another, the quickness with which he reacts to changes in a situation, his ability to control his moods and attitude, his readiness to render a comrade assistance, and, finally, his inclination toward the development of a competitive spirit in the performance of his

military duties. In other words, a well-organized training exercise, taken as a whole, touches upon the different aspects of a seaman's training--the technical, the psychological, and the moral.

The specifics of the method of conducting training exercises have to be conveyed to ships' officers by specially trained instructors in damage-control simulators and facilities. In practice one sometimes comes up against problems of a different kind. We recall how following a training session in a unique simulator developed by skilled naval personnel one of the instructors exulted in the fact that he had "driven the executive officer into a corner." Any reason for an unsuccessful training session he could not give. But the reasons were obvious--the seamen were using the simulator for the first time, they had not yet developed any skill in the operations required, and so naturally they became highly excited and confused. There was a nervousness in the atmosphere surrounding the training session and one could sense the instructor's urge to "fail" the new trainees no matter what. Rather than being of some benefit, the training exercise exerted a harmful effect, for it produced in these seamen a prejudice against the new equipment.

Everybody welcomes training exercises without simplifications and qualifications. But, in itself, a complex situation still does not develop in personnel the requisite psychological attributes. A training director will achieve his goals if he provides active direction of the training process, proceeding from the simple to the complex. This is the way our best methods specialists do it.

Captain-Lieutenant-Engineer V. Zyblev breaks down the process of damage-control training for seamen into several stages. During the initial stage they develop the operational skills required in various typical conditions under which their military duties are performed, skills, for example, in the use of fire extinguishers, screw clamps, and supports and extinguishing fires and sealing holes under not too difficult conditions. The second stage serves to develop psychodynamic stereotypes in the course of operations performed under conditions imposed by real danger and a strict time limitation. Wide use is made in this connection of simulators and special instructional-training facilities. The final stage involves training exercises in the ship's compartments and at battle stations which are made increasingly complex. Officer Zyblev is successfully putting into practice his extensive knowledge in the area of military pedagogy and psychology and in the training and indoctrination of personnel he skillfully employs the various methods of party-political work. In the department which he heads active publicity is given to advanced experience and knowledge, there is study of the examples of the resourcefulness of personnel involved in damage-control operations during the Great Patriotic War, and analyses are presented of instructive instances which have occurred elsewhere in the navy.

Officer Zyblev is happy to share his knowledge with warrant officers and petty officers, who are seamen's primary instructors. With Warrant Officer G. Shevchuk, for example, he had several discussions of the behavioral characteristics of troops in critical situations and of the stress situations which sometimes develop with the appearance of real danger. Junior officers have supported Zyblev in his efforts, and every seaman receives satisfaction from having been able to discover new attributes within himself in the course of increasingly complex training exercises and learned new work methods.

Of great assistance to Captain-Lieutenant-Engineer Zyblev in his study of the psychological characteristics of military personnel are specially developed charts. They show the various levels of their condition, activity, and frame of mind under extraordinary conditions. Evaluation is done on the basis of a seven-point scale. The officer observes the training behavior of the troops and evaluates every mental characteristic for each one. Then they themselves fill out the charts prior to the training critique. Comparison suggests areas for future training emphasis in the case of individual trainees. A comprehensive, well-thought-out approach to training has made it possible for the subordinates of Captain-Lieutenant-Engineer V. Zyblev to win first place in the fleet in competition in special training and ability to perform damage-control operations.

Incidentally, Officer Martynov, who was mentioned at the beginning of the article, after studying available advanced experience and know-how, has now made substantial changes in his methods of instructing personnel; and the effectiveness of the training exercises conducted in his department has been noticeably increased.

Proceeding on the basis of the requirements contained in the Letter of the CC CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the AUCCTU, and the CC VLKSM /Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League/ concerning the development of socialist competition in 1978, our officers are now in the process of searching out any potential for increasing the effectiveness and quality of the training provided personnel. It is clear that becoming of important assistance in their work is the accumulated shipboard experience in organizing training exercises, taking into account the requirements of military pedagogy and psychology.

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CSO: 1801

OFFICER TRAINING ON DIESEL SUBMARINE DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 78 p 1

[Article by Captain 1st Rank N. Remizov: "Officers in Training"]

[Text] A group of officers with the little engineers' hammer insignia on their shoulder boards passed on into the submarine's diesel engine compartment. "A commission," thought the seamen who met them. But as it turned out, staff officer Captain 2d Rank-Engineer Ye. Andrusenko had decided to conduct here a not entirely routine training exercise with mechanical engineers from several ships. The unusual thing about it was the subject itself: "Preparing for Start-up and the Start-up and Shutdown of the Diesel Engine." That is, these officers were to work through the procedures comprising this aspect of the operational responsibilities of seamen and petty officers. It should be said immediately that training exercises like this are not a very frequent thing. Their utility and necessity, however, have been set forth in the Navy Shipboard Regulations, which point out that a subunit [podrazdeleniye] officer should know the responsibilities of his subordinates so well and be so familiar with the ship's equipment that he would be able at any time to take over for a subordinate and perform his duties.

The likelihood that such a fill-in role would be required under ordinary conditions is not very great; but, as experience shows, the most unexpected situations may arise under combat conditions. For all that, though, when the staff officer planned the subjects to be covered in the course of this training exercise, he set up goals which were much more far-reaching than simply sharpening mechanical engineers' skills in operating diesel engines.

At times, unfortunately, the working contacts between a chief and his subordinate prove to produce too few results because of the rather theoretical notions the officer entertains regarding the purely practical activities of the petty officer and seaman. It is one thing, let us say, to attempt to imagine the psychological

effect produced on a seaman by the operation of the reducer safety valve (which resembles the firing off of a round and requires a quick, the proper reaction), and quite another to experience this situation oneself. Or take the search for more efficient work methods. One of the unit's specialists, of course, will, most frequently, exceed the officer in his level of skill in operating and maintaining a piece of equipment. But then, the officer, with his high level of engineering and technical training, can, in the course of a subordinate's routine operations in his work area, spot and observe that essential aspect of the operation performed which is highly necessary for the further improvement of the seaman's skills. To work out, figuratively speaking, an algorithm for increasing skill levels on the part of personnel and ways to improve the method of training. Finally, the moral factor is of no small importance. In the eyes of a seaman who is convinced of the officer's practical competence, the last-named can be of great advantage. It sometimes proves to be a reliable way to win trust and a favorable disposition towards oneself.

The role of section leader was being played for the first time in connection with this diesel engine by Captain-Lieutenant-Engineer A. Strakhov. The staff officer "appointed" Senior Lieutenant-Engineer V. Skok the senior specialist, while Lieutenant-Engineer S. Ushanov was assigned to the diesel engine mechanics.

Captain 2d Rank-Engineer Ye. Andrusenko smilingly but silently observed a certain tension among the officers. Outwardly they attempted to remain calm and even tossed a few jokes around among themselves; but each one, of course, was trying to avoid even the least slipup.

The command was given. The training exercise began. Strakhov's orders and actions were precise and confident. One sensed the impression made by the work style of a mechanical engineer from an outstanding submarine. He reported concisely and proficiently on the mistakes made by his fellow crew members as well.

"But what has the 'section leader' himself overlooked?" the training director suddenly asked Captain-Lieutenant-Engineer V. Kreyz, who until then had only been observing the activities of his colleagues.

As it turned out, Strakhov had not informed the neighboring compartment regarding when he would engage the forward coupling and the air-powered turn-over of the diesel engine.

One might ask whether it was worthwhile to study the performance of these officers in such detail. But Captain 2d Rank-Engineer Ye. Andrusenko had not overlooked the slightest thing. Senior

Lieutenant-Engineer V. Skok, let us say, failed to check the preparation of the gas flap valve for hydraulic operation. This was simply a failure to adhere to the rules. And then the point at which the drain cocks are to be closed is not clearly brought out in the instructions. One has to be able to feel it, as we say. And it should not be done as quickly as Skok did it.

Following the critique and analysis of deficiencies, which proceeded on in this vein, the training director emphasized that unit specialists commit errors like this in the course of the maintenance they perform on the diesel engines. Personal experience should therefore help officers detect the causes of these typical mistakes and, in the process of training submarine personnel, to avoid the development on their part of bad habits and improper operational procedures.

No less seriously did the staff officer discuss with the mechanical engineers questions involving the further improvement of diesel engine maintenance. He advised all of them to familiarize themselves with the reference manual prepared during the last cruise by Captain-Lieutenant-Engineer V. Kreyza. On the basis of his own practical observations, this officer was able to develop suggestions for improving the quality of performing one of the important technical operations.

As they continued the development of their practical skills, the mechanical engineers took down notes for themselves in the course of their training exercise. They recorded those observations which then, after thorough analysis, development, and joint discussions, may become new elements in the technical maintenance process.

Staff officer Ye. Andrusenko is well-known in the unit as a passionate advocate of practical training for mechanical engineers. He is convinced that only on the basis of a high level of operational knowledge is it possible to conduct the searching inquiry, which, in its turn, makes it possible to improve methods of equipment maintenance. It has become a rule aboard ship to plan scientific-research and efficiency-improvement operations and to assume in these areas specific socialist obligations for each long-range cruise. Captain-Lieutenant-Engineer A. Strakhov and other mechanical engineers have prepared interesting reference manuals on the basis of their practical training exercises and their accumulated cruise experience. They are active in the area of efficiency improvement and possess inventors' certificates. Not so long ago, for example, Vadim Kreyza introduced a valuable suggestion for increasing the reliability of the warning system. He worked out some interesting technical ideas in the course of a long-range cruise, while Senior Lieutenant-Engineer V. Skok then insured their operational realization.

Reference works and suggestions for improving efficiency are approved by the staff, and the most valuable one is then recommended for study and adoption by other units.

The staff officer and communist Captain 2d Rank-Engineer Andrusenko himself sets the tone in creative work. He is successfully at work on a dissertation dealing with the problems involved in the technical training of ships' captains and the optimum cycle for employing the submarine in the accomplishment of tasks at sea. Under his guidance, creative plans for the ship's mechanical engineers are drawn up for each cruise. What has become well-worn and thoroughly developed in the course of long-range cruises then becomes a subject for seminar discussions and falls into the scales of competition.

The training exercise is finished. Outwardly it took on a rather unusual aspect, with officers taking the roles of petty officers and seamen. But its basic inner content will without doubt extend beyond the scope of the usual results of exercises like this. The mechanical engineers have already given more than one practical demonstration of this.

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CSO: 1801

ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES IN MILITARY PLANT CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Colonel-Engineer L. Kulikov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Saving Remedy"]

[Text] "It seems to me that the practice which has become well established in our military enterprise is of doubtful legality. Now the thing is that in the process of fulfilling our own plan we include on the books the products of another enterprise. This is simply done: we buy expensive metal slabs, let us say, from a neighboring plant, paint them, include the cost of the slabs and that of painting them in our plan, and then sell them to the very same plant. Then that plant includes these products in its plan...."

From a letter to the editors.

"Yes, this is exactly the way things are," declared the manager of the enterprise, Colonel-Engineer V. Anufriyev, after I acquainted him with the contents of the letter to the editors. Vladimir Pakhomovich went on to explain that without these so-called outside orders it is doubtful they would be able to fulfill their production plan with respect to the monetary calculations involved. And what would stand to benefit from not mastering the plan? Neither the honor of the personnel nor their material incentives. Everything we do, insists Anufriyev, is done on legal judicial ground.

All external orders are indeed placed and filled on contractual bases and approved by higher administrative authorities. In accordance with contracts for 1977 and 1978, for example, the enterprise has produced a batch of diesel engine ventilator supports for a plant of the Ministry of Heavy, Power, and Transport Machine Building of the USSR. When you begin to look into the

key points of these contracts you see in them a bargain struck, a salutary contrivance, a saving remedy, rather than a purely business-oriented collaboration between two zealous production managers.

Here are the facts. The enterprise manufactured metal ventilator frames for its neighboring plant and then included in its plan the value of the ventilators themselves, which are stored in its partner's warehouses. Of course, this is nothing other than a kind of window dressing. This deception is carried still further by the fact that after these products are "mutually" reflected in the plans of both the purchaser and the supplier they become much more expensive. The plant sells its ventilators to the enterprise for 452 rubles each and then buys them for 611 rubles apiece. By including this type of equipment in its "physical unit production" at a higher price, both partners derive an advantage (plan fulfillment increases in ruble terms), but the state suffers a loss. For the price of the product is artificially increased, and then consumer organizations buy them, roughly speaking, at "speculative" prices.

Other orders like this also provide a source of profit for the enterprise. Diesel engine buffers, in particular. The plant sells buffer disks and rods to the enterprise. Using electric arc welding and a drilling machine, Comrade Anufriyev's skilled workmen make one buffer from two blanks. With a considerable increase in price, the finished product is then returned, for payment, to the plant. That is, everything proceeds in accordance with the well-known scheme: "You scratch our back and we'll scratch yours." As a result, production is brought into line with plan requirements in both enterprises and both the bonuses and the devil's wage are paid in timely fashion.

It should be pointed out that the role of the "buyer" is played not only by the "outside" plant, but by the military enterprise as well. The roles are reversed, and then there is another preamble: the supplier plant is obligated to manufacture such-and-such from materials provided by the buyer. The preamble is different, but the essentials remain the same.

In order to get at the root of these outside orders themselves, I had to arrange a meeting with Colonel V. Kokurin, chairman of the administration to which the military enterprise is subordinate. Vasilii Aleksandrovich agreed: nothing good comes of the fact of one and the same product's showing on the books of the two units as contributing to their fulfillment of plan requirements. But then he qualified this by saying that "we are not the only ones engaged in this practice." Now with respect to these outside orders, this operation, which is a secondary one as far as the enterprise is concerned, is, in general, of some advantage, for by this means production growth can be projected and other production indices improved.

"The question of whether or not outside orders should form part of the enterprise's plans is not for us to answer," observed Colonel Kokurin. "But as for the practice of including slabs from another plan in one's own plan must, of course, be looked into."

It must indeed be looked into. For if we proceed further along the course now being taken by some "resourceful" managers, we will reach the point where the installation of window glass in diesel engines produced by another plant will be considered a basis for entering this enormous steel product in one's plan in the section headed: "Produced By Our Own Resources." But it seems to me that it would be better to erect a solid barrier across this path. At the same time we should raise the question of calling to account those managers who orient themselves on fulfillment of their plans without taking into account the interests of society.

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CSO: 1801

IRREGULARITY IN PARTY MEMBERSHIP SELECTION NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 78 p 2

[Letter with Comment by Captain 2d Rank-Engineer L. Klimchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Principled Stand...In Revenge"]

[Text] I turn to the editors with a request for clarification: is it permissible deliberately to violate provisions of the party regulations? This happened with us. At one of our party meetings Captain V. Ionenko was refused membership in the CPSU, but some comrades have done everything they could to see that Ionenko receives a party card....

Major K. Snezhko,
Deputy Party Organization Secretary.

I will qualify my answer immediately by declaring that Konstantine Grigor'yevich Snezhko is not so uninformed a man as to ask in all seriousness: is one permitted to violate the provisions of the party regulations? He knows very well that the answer to this question can be only in the negative.

But let us take everything in order.

From the references, recommendations, and opinions expressed with regard to Captain V. Ionenko it is clear that during his time as a candidate member of the party he received an advancement in military rank and responsibility. He mastered his new duties quickly. He is studying by correspondence with an institution higher education. He is a good family man. It has been observed, however, that he lacks the required tact in his relations with his subordinates. But almost all the unit's communists insist that by virtue of his political, moral, and practical attributes, V. Ionenko is worthy of membership in the CPSU.

On his part, communist Snezhko does not really have any weighty arguments against adding Ionenko to the ranks of the party. Konstantin Grigor'yevich himself, moreover, had provided Ionenko with one of his recommendations for becoming a candidate member of the CPSU. But then a conflict arose between these officers. Ever since then, strange as it may seem, Snezhko sometimes has carried his attitude toward Ionenko over into the area of social activities.

This also the way it was at the meeting which took up the matter of granting party membership to Captain Ionenko. Major K. Snezhko did not arrive at the meeting in time. Now since the subunit's [podrazdeleniye] party organization is a small one, 5 communists altogether, and every vote a decisive one, the four who had come to the meeting were inclined to believe it would be better to postpone it. The communists nevertheless remained in the subunit area. Except, that is, for Warrant Officer [michman] I. Kravtsov, who had stood watch the previous 24 hours, was at sea, and therefore left to return to his quarters. He had warned them, though, that if Major Snezhko arrived and insisted on opening the meeting they were to call him.

Then sure enough, Snezhko did arrive shortly thereafter. And he did insist on opening the meeting. This was done hastily, without notifying Warrant Officer Kravtsov. As a result, two communists actually voted to accept Ionenko and two voted against.

One of those who voted against was Snezhko. The other was Captain-Lieutenant V. Shishayev. "I yielded to the influence of Major Snezhko," Shishayev now explained.

At the party meeting, unfortunately, the communists proved unable to rise to the occasion with respect to knowledge of the Rules of the CPSU. Contrary to their provisions, they counted as a vote in favor of acceptance that of the absent Warrant Officer Kravtsov. Believing that a majority of the communists has expressed themselves in favor of accepting Ionenko as a member of the party, they entered in the minutes the notation: to be considered accepted. This in spite of the fact that this situation called not for a simple majority, but rather for a two-thirds majority.

Snezhko could not but know that this was in violation of party norms. But he did not interfere with the course of the meeting, nor did he point out to the young communists the obvious error in their proceedings. He took his time. Then he wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. This delayed reaction provides more evidence that the principled stand taken up by the communist Snezhko was prompted by motives connected with his own personal scheme: by wounded pride and a desire to have things his way, to make it "hot" for Ionenko, no matter what the consequences.

In the presence of this correspondent, political officers, particularly Lieutenant Colonel B. Sorokin, did not cease to profess their distress at the "technical error" involved in accepting Captain V. Ionenko as a member of the CPSU.

But for some reason none of the senior comrades have expressed any special anxiety over the position taken by the communist Snezhko and the nature of the mutual relations which have developed between certain members of the unit.

To the end of returning the state of affairs within the party organization to normal, it is now very important thoroughly and attentively to look into what has taken place and come up with a true evaluation of the point of view of each communist. It is by this means alone that true party-minded principledness can be strengthened and maintained within the unit.

8963
CSO: 1801

TANK COMPANY FIRING TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 78 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel G. Savchuk, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Measuring in Seconds"]

[Text] The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows how important it is in military training to adhere to the principle: "anticipated, the enemy defeated." An effort to surpass norms is the urgent imperative of time which follows from the demands of modern-day warfare. In military training exercises the stopwatch has become the objective arbiter which accustoms people to value time, to treasure each second.

To illustrate this proposition I will tell about a tank firing text exercise conducted in the company commanded by Captain A. Kostryukov. During this exercise crews were to improve their skills in firing during movement on bobbing and moving targets. Commanders were to determine the crews' readiness to perform these firing exercises and check on the fulfillment of the socialist obligations assumed by unit personnel.

The success of each exercise and the effectiveness of socialist competition are determined by the organizational work done just before the exercise.

Prior to the exercise the tankmen exchanged experiences in the execution of fire missions and the elimination of delays in the process of firing and assumed specific socialist obligations. Platoon newssheets provided a visual reflection of established standard requirements and the best time turned in during the previous exercise. Prior to the beginning of the training exercise, Captain Kostryukov once again gave out the record time and the last names of the soldiers and NCO's who turned in the highest scores. Among them tank commanders Junior Sergeants A. Il'yushin and A. Kozhin and gunners Privates V. Mel'nikov and A. Sharipov.

And now the command is heard to begin the exercise. We are with the tank platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Kozik. In one of the training positions are gunners Privates A. Andryushin and V. Dzhioyev. These soldiers are competing against each other, for both of them have assumed the obligation of meeting the standard requirements with an "excellent" rating. Each of them is now turning all efforts and skills to winning first place. Both gunners fulfill their obligations in a flawless manner, surpassing by far the time requirement for an excellent rating. Who won? The senior lieutenant looked at his stopwatch: Andryushin came out slightly ahead of his comrade.

Senior Lieutenant Kozik moves to another training position. Here loaders Privates M. Gamerzadashvili and A. Rozhabov are to load the machine gun paired with the tank gun and eliminate any snags developing during the firing.

The soldiers set skillfully to work. Each movement was measured and one could sense in everything they did their desire to perform their operations quickly and accurately.

"Ready!" sounds out the voice of Gamerzadashvili.

The commander looks at his stopwatch. The time is excellent. But how is Private Rozhabov getting along? He has taken too long. As it turned out, a problem delay developed which he could not handle. It is important to the officer not only to determine the winners and the losers, but also to insure that each of his subordinates turns in an error-free performance with his weapon. So he interrupts the exercise. He points out to Rozhabov his error and shows him the proper way to eliminate the snag. Rozhabov begins everything from the beginning. This time his comrades are watching him. The soldier performs his tasks in a thorough, painstaking manner. This time his score was far from getting him an "excellent" rating, but at least it was much better than the one before. The main thing was that he had performed all operations with great accuracy.

As you watch these tankmen you can see the beneficial effect the use of the competitive method has on the course of the exercise. Soldiers and NCO's strive to carry out every command and achieve each norm in the best manner possible.

The competitive spirit is especially clearly demonstrated during the conduct of individual crew training exercises. In this case there is an effort not only to achieve a high personal score, but also to combine together the efforts of all and bring success to the crew as a whole.

Let us say, for example, that the crew is involved in a training exercise in converting the tank's fighting compartment and weapons from their travelling positions to their firing positions and back again. The norms here are very exacting. But in spite of this the crew led by Sergeant A. Luppov surpassed the norm time by 10 seconds. In the process the crew members made not a single error. During the course of the entire training exercise no one was able to better this time.

At no matter which training position we found ourselves, the picture was everywhere the same: there was everywhere being waged an enthusiastic battle for seconds. At the same time, though, Captain A. Kostyuk and the other officers did not neglect the skill with which all operations were performed. If a norm was accomplished improperly or with some procedure out of sequence, the entire operation was repeated. This forced everyone to be exceedingly disciplined and attentive and to put their utmost effort into their work.

This training confirmed once again the importance of competition in exercises. To give it the attention it deserves is to create a solid basis for a successful conclusion to winter training and total fulfillment of socialist obligations.

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NEED FOR CLASS RATING SYSTEM FOR METROLOGISTS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 78 p 2

[Article by Colonel-Engineer S. Shabalin: "Military Metrologists Need a Class Rating System"]

[Text] It would surely be unnecessary today to convince someone of the importance of metrology. It has long since become an independent science involving measurements, the methods and means of insuring their unity, and means of achieving the required accuracy. Metrology intrudes in an active way into various spheres of human activity, including the military one. Moreover, metrological support determines to a great extent the level of combat readiness maintained by units and ships. This fact imposes special requirements upon the military metrologist, a specialist in the operation, checking, and repair of measuring equipment.

The laboratory operation of measuring equipment requires a continually increasing knowledge of both the equipment itself and the means of conducting measurements. Efficient utilization of standard precision equipment would be unthinkable without a high level of technical training and knowledge of the bases of the theory of probabilities and mathematical statistics, physics and electrical engineering, and radio engineering and methods of analyzing the results of measurements.

Active duty personnel have available to them a good school in armed forces metrological units. The skills they acquire in maintaining military equipment and reconditioning instruments sometimes open up to them new areas from which to select specializations and careers to pursue after their service in the army.

Considering the requirements imposed nowadays for the training of military metrologists and their increasing role in assuring combat readiness, the time has perhaps come to take a centralized look at the matter of introducing a system of awarding class ratings to specialists in this area. Enlisted men and officers of metrological units must now test for a class rating in other specialities unconnected with their main job.

Upon fulfilling the general requirements for all class-rated specialists in the armed forces, the military metrologist could, for example, become a "master", having the same proficiency level of a "senior inspector", or, having been rated excellent in training and examinations in the appropriate organization, a specialist 1st class, who may check instruments for no fewer than two types of measurements (for electric and radiomeasuring, for example); a specialist 2d class, who may check one type; or a specialist 3d class, who may check and mark a limited number of pieces of measuring equipment. One could give analogous class rating features for measuring-instrument repair specialists as well.

The effort to improve the class rating system will help military metrologists increase their knowledge and improve their skills; it will be of tangible benefit to the overall effort to improve metrological support for weapons and military equipment; and, as a result, it will contribute to raising the level of combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

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MARSHAL BAGRAMYAN'S MEMOIRS REVIEWED BY MARSHAL CHUYKOV

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 78 p 2

[Review article by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union: "Throughout the War"]

[Text] I have read the books written by my wartime colleague, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, "How the War Began" and "Our Path to Victory", and these were my first thoughts. It would appear that the author is recounting for us the most difficult and sanguinary of the wars our fatherland has ever lived through; and then one closes these memoirs with a serene feeling, one which combines both pride in our great motherland and in our great people and confidence in the happy future of our vast state.

Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan saw active duty through all 1,418 fiery days of the Great Patriotic War. He has something to tell, and he knows how to tell it. His keen eye and retentive memory unerringly search out from the endless succession of action-filled days of combat the most important, the most significant, and the most representative events and developments. This makes it possible for the reader to catch a glimpse of the war, as it were, from the inside, to live through it alongside the soldier as he attacks or in the trenches and the front commander in his command post.

I will speak in much detail about the first volume, which is devoted to the grimmest period, the initial period, of the Great Patriotic War. The first printing of it has already been widely reviewed in our press. I will mention only the following: it describes the full drama of the events following the perfidious attack on our motherland of the fascist German invaders, who, like bandits, disrupted the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. Just as fully does it reveal the immense strength of spirit displayed by Soviet fighting men--soldiers, commanders, and political workers of all ranks. I. Kh. Bagramyan shows convincingly

that in the first weeks and months of the war the Soviet Army did not only retreat--it dealt the aggressors a powerful rebuff and defeated the enemy more than once.

The second volume of Ivan Khristoforovich's memoirs covers the events of the Great Patriotic War from December 1941 to its victorious conclusion. In addition to those merits of the volume which place it among the best works of this type, and about which I will speak below, it makes a significant contribution, in my view, to the historiography of the second world war. For what this book does is to bring out in detail a number of operations which previously were either entirely unknown to the great mass of readers, or else were only extremely superficially covered. I have in mind the Barvenkovo-Lozovaya, Khar'kov, Zhizdra, Gorodok, Memel, and a few other operations. In addition, the author also introduces much new material in his description of those battles and encounters which have already been fairly widely covered in our literature. For example, the book provides a thorough analysis of the operations of the 11th Guards Army on the Western Front along with its neighboring units in the course of a deep flank attack on the enemy's Bolkhov-Orel grouping.

I. Kh. Bagramyan introduces us, as it were, into a military leader's creative laboratory: he reveals to us the complex process of drawing up a plan of operation and reflects on the role of accumulated experience and know-how. It is highly instructive to observe the commander's party-principled stand, which guided him when he had to go "against the stream." During the period of preparation for the Orel operation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army, General I. Kh. Bagramyan, objected categorically to several aspects of the plan which had been submitted by the commanders of the Western and Bryansk Fronts and proposed a sounder, more effective solution. This solution found support and approval in the Stavka.

In 1974, French television organized a discussion of the battles which took place in the fiery Kursk salient. Participating in this discussion were Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan, who headed our delegation, Colonel General (Ret.) N. A. Lomov, and Colonel B. G. Solov'yev. On the opposing side were military figures and historians from several Western European countries, including the former commander of a regiment of the Wehrmacht's 78th Assault Division, Colonel Hollander, and the noted West German historian Klink, the author of a highly tendentious monograph on the operation of the Hitlerite armies around Kursk and Belgorod in the summer of 1943.

Ivan Khristoforovich only mentions this discussion in the second volume of his memoirs, but it occurs to me that our readers should have a better idea of it.

The collapse of German fascism as a result of the second world war even today allows no rest to the enemies of peace and socialism. Hitler's Germany and its Wehrmacht were the shock forces of imperialism, and objectively to portray the victory of Soviet arms and assess the role of the Soviet Union and its valiant Armed Forces in the destruction of the fascist German hordes is to affirm before the peoples of the world the superiority of our social, political, and economic system. This, of course, does not set well with the imperialists. So they attempt in every possible way to underestimate the contribution made by the USSR to the victory over German fascism and Japanese imperialism. West German revanchist forces are especially assiduous in this regard.

One of the trump cards played in this highly undignified cheating game are references to the limited strategic sense of Hitler himself, who is supposed to have led Germany to defeat. In particular, the Führer is saddled, as we say, with all the blame for the destruction of the fascist German forces at Stalingrad.

So now we come to the Kursk salient. It is impossible to make Hitler the scapegoat here, for from its very inception "Operation Citadel" was planned by Wehrmacht generals with the vision of the total victory of fascist German military science and military art. But what with the concern and efforts of our Communist Party; the talent of our military leaders; and the courage, steadfastness, and military skill of our commanders, political workers, NCO's, and soldiers, this dream was turned to ashes. Soviet forces dealt the enemy a blow in the Kursk salient of such destructive might that fascist Germany was unable to recover before the end of the war.

To what, then, do the apologists of revanchism have recourse? When they do not subtly philosophize, they simply do not mention the battle of Kursk; when this gets them nowhere, they consider it an engagement of little more than local significance. It was in approximately these terms that Ernst Klink formulated the question during the discussion in the studio of French television.

Millions of French people witnessed the indisputable facts presented by I. Kh. Bagramyan and his colleagues in the delegation force Klink, first, to go over to a hopeless defensive, one which there was no possibility of bringing to a halt, and then to fall back, taking cover under new conjectures, at this point bringing in other issues as well. French wags were immediately prompted to observe that there had been "another rout in the Kursk salient."

This bit of additional information I have provided about the discussion on French television will plainly help the reader of the second volume of Ivan Khristoforovich's memoirs understand that

the chapter entitled "The Collapse of the Citadel" is nothing other than new, indisputable evidence on behalf of historical truth, a well-argued unmasking of bourgeois falsifiers of the history of the second world war.

Ivan Khristoforovich's memoirs are an attractive piece of work in that they do not limit themselves to portraying only the successes of Soviet forces. I. Kh. Bagramyan has considered it necessary to provide a frank and honest account of some of our mistakes as well. In the fighting around Khar'kov in May and June of 1942, for example, the epilogue to which was highly dramatic for the Soviet side. The author recounts this operation of forces of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, concealing as he goes the mistakes of neither higher nor lower levels of command nor those he himself made.

The second volume of I. Kh. Bagramyan's memoirs as well as the first provides an analysis of events which is not only thorough, but understandable for the general reader as well. It not only describes how operational plans were conceived and how they were carried out in the course of military operations. Passing before the reader in the marshal's memoirs is an entire gallery of portraits of Soviet fighting men of all ranks. And this is no slip of the pen, for this is precisely what they are; and although the author is no artist with words, his heroes are by no means imaginary people. Yet Ivan Khristoforovich's powers of observation, his phenomenal memory, and his without question most painstaking study of documentary material have made it possible for him to portray on the pages of his narrative dozens of participants in events; to bring out the individual character of most of them; and to depict the dynamics of the development of their military attributes, their combat skills, their party-mindedness, and their communist convictions.

We have all too many people who can speak nobly about the great mission of the Soviet soldier. But you will read many a fat volume of memoirs and not find in it not one soldier's name, not counting, perhaps, the names of those heroes which have already gone into the lists. I. Kh. Bagramyan does not simply declare his love for the soldier--he writes about it. He writes with a paternal love and a heartfelt gratitude. From his attentive and benevolent gaze escapes not a single feature of the Soviet soldier's character.

An indisputable merit of both of Ivan Khristoforovich's books is their detailed, and I would also say penetrating, description of the activities of the emissaries of the party to the troops in the field, the political workers, those who by their Bolshevik word and deed provided instruction and indoctrination in the spirit of boundless devotion to the motherland. For example, the

skilled and fully presented party-political work preceding the Barvenkovo-Lozovaya operation and during the course of it. The author emphasizes that "the steadfast, truly heroic, labors of the political apparatus were highly valued by the party and the supreme command. Many political workers were awarded orders and medals. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, in particular, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner."

I have not undertaken to mention all the interesting and instructive information Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan has been able to present in his solidly fact- and idea-packed volumes. These are truly party-minded books of wisdom which it would profit every soldier and every Soviet citizen to read.

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NAVAL TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Training on Missile Boats

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 May 78 p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Prisyazhnyuk: "From Analysis to Action: Competition at the Service of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The Letter of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee on developing socialist competition in 1978 pointed out the need for widely disseminating and introducing the experience of competition leaders; it also pointed out the need for an in-depth analysis of the reasons for not fulfilling pledges and the need to help all competition participants reach higher frontiers. It is important for us, in the military collectives, to continually determine whether we are making full use of the possibilities inherent in competition and whether we are thoroughly analyzing its results and daily practice. This task is especially timely now when the results of the winter training period have been evaluated and the time for intensive summer training is approaching.

The movement for the leading unit, which was developed at the initiative of the soldiers of the Taman Division, provided a new impetus to competition and it enriched its content and forms. For example, this year, the officers of our staff and political section, the Flag specialists, have begun to work more aggressively on the ships and they have begun to take a more thoughtful attitude toward the analysis of training and competition.

As the winter training experience testifies, the struggle for first place has noticeably livened up between departments and

ships of the same class and the equipment of the shore training classrooms is being put to better use. Seminars are organized on a regular basis to exchange experience. Competitions for the title of best specialist are being conducted in an instructive manner; a special commission determines the competition winners. All of this makes it possible to increase the effectiveness of competition.

However, you can still come across cases where individual commanders are only analyzing the military and technical aspect of matters when evaluating the results; they are talking in isolation from the other aspects of competition, including the moral aspects. Sometimes, you can hear statements like this: since the boat successfully handled range practice, this means it is undoubtedly the competition leader. But, they do not take into account the fact that violations of military discipline have not been eliminated on the boat and that it only passed the ship-type training task at the second try. In other words, the moral climate in the collective is not taken into account; the importance of competition in building character is played down. Overcoming the one-sidedness of this approach to evaluating the role and results of competition is an important task and a lot here depends on a thoughtful and full analysis of the state of affairs in the collective.

The guided-missile boat commanded by SR LT V. Bortitskiy is recognized as the best in the subunit. And not just because the crew carries out all its range practice with high marks. It was also given first place because there is a friendly collective on the boat; the collective's interpersonal relations are organized strictly according to the regulations and by observing the norms of friendly mutual assistance. You will not see despondent people here; work proceeds with spark and zeal.

To a great extent, the combat attitude is explained by the fact that the sailors have developed a desire to hold their boat's honor high. This desire is inculcated from the first day of a sailor's arrival in the crew. A good tradition has developed of greeting the young seamen warmly and putting them on line within a short period of time. As a rule, the specialists take the newcomers under their unique tutelage; they help them pass the tests--which permit them to operate the equipment on their own--on time. The tone, in training and competition, is set by the military affairs experts and first class specialists WO A. Shadilov (secretary of the boat's party organization), WO's V. Koryakov and I. Chuvalov and PO 1st Class D. Varkentin.

If you examine the sailors' individual pledges, you will see that they are specific and they are compiled with due regard for the man's length of service, his training level and the missions which his department is accomplishing. Headed by PO 2nd Class S. Larin, the boat's Komsomol members are working aggressively. They stepped forward with an initiative--all servicemen in the last year of their service must train their replacement from among the junior seamen.

Things develop differently on the boat commanded by SrLt G. Balayev. Several years ago, it was outstanding, but then it lost this title. True, the sailors fired pretty good this year. But then, the crew decided, and it was agreed upon in the subunit, that they were prepared to struggle for the title of outstanding boat and that they could win it again. However, they obviously did not choose the right way to achieve this goal. Instead of persistently improving their level of training, they began to artificially overstate their marks and they did not notice individual shortcomings. General, nonspecific points were predominant in the sailors' pledges. Unfortunately, the subunit commander and party organization were not conscientious in evaluating things on the boat.

Under a more thorough analysis, it turned out that there were other, similar cases in the subunit. For example, the statistics testify to a decrease in so-called petty violations of discipline. Actually, there was a desire to gloss over the gray areas and show that the pledges on observing the standards of conduct were being successfully fulfilled.

And then, as though quite unexpectedly--superficially--WO V. Shekhovtsev flagrantly violated the regulations. Upon investigation, it was discovered that both SR LT G. Balayev, the ship's captain, and WO I. Dronov, the secretary of the party organization, previously knew about Shekhovtsev's isolated, unseemly acts, but they did not take any action because they did not want to "wash their dirty linen in public."

In short, competition on the boat was far from completely serving the goals of increasing the soldiers' level of training and discipline. Decisive measures were needed to rectify the situation. However, all the shortcomings still have not been eliminated here.

An in-depth analysis of the state of affairs in the two military collectives served as a good impetus for the officers of the headquarters and political section in their work on improving the organization of training and competition on ships. This work became more specific and purposeful.

For example, how can you achieve a situation where all the sailors have an in-depth knowledge of their specialty and are skillfully applying this knowledge in practice? The officers of the headquarters and political section came to the conclusion that it was necessary to make better use of the force of the officers' and WO's personal example and to increase the prestige of the military affairs experts. It was decided to create a unique school for the experts. This work was headed by Engr-Capt 2d Rank L. Bratkovskiy, an officer from headquarters. The ship captains and their party organizations carefully analyzed which of their officers and warrant officers would have a real chance to take the expert's frontier and they helped them take this into consideration in their individual pledges. The lessons in the school are conducted by the best trained specialists in educational methods from among the captains and engineers and headquarters officers. A continuing exchange of experience for mastering and using weapons and equipment during voyages and exercises is underway here.

The officers and warrant officers who have become military affairs experts are without a doubt conducting the lessons in their specialty with the petty officers and seamen on a more qualified basis. But, no less important is the fact that the sailors are following their moral example and they are striving to master higher frontiers of combat improvement during training and competition. Incidentally, remembering how hard they worked to win the title of expert, the officers and warrant officers are very exacting in their approach to rating the sailors' training and competition results; they are not easy going with them.

Work better today than yesterday and work better tomorrow than today--this is the slogan of the day. If its resources are fully used, competition will help achieve this noble goal.

Athletic Program Criticism

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 78 p 4

[Letter and Comment by Cadet A. Shestakov and Maj O. Fedoseyev:
"Excommunicated from Running..."]

[Text] Dear Editors:

While still in school, I was enthusiastic about track and field events; I fulfilled the standard for a first-class athlete and, when I entered the Higher Naval Radio-electronic Institute imeni A. S. Popov, I had no doubt that within its walls I would be able to continue my training, improve my results in races and try to achieve my dream--to become a sports expert. But, it turned out that not just I but many of my comrades are deprived of this opportunity since this kind of sport is not being developed at the institute. Furthermore, for the second year now (I am now in my second year), I am becoming firmly convinced that naval service and track and field are incompatible and, therefore, we are not developing it; for greater persuasiveness, I will cite these reasons: no track and field contests are planned in the Navy and the "queen of sports" is also not on the program of the sports games for the naval educational institutions.

Unfortunately this is true. Why is there such a lack of attention for track and field events in the Navy?

Cadet A. Shestakov

Our reporter asked Maj O. Fedoseyev--a recently well known track and field athlete, a silver medal winner at the 18th Olympic Games in Tokoyo and an honored sports expert--to comment on Cadet A. Shestakov's letter:

"In my time, I had the good fortune to appear with remarkable naval experts: two-time Olympic champion

V. Kuts, Olympic Prize Winner B. Tokarev and world record holder S. Lobastov. Even earlier, the Navy trained such outstanding sportsmen like long distance runner N. Popov, high jumper Yu. Ilyasov and others. Regretfully, all of this is just a memory now. Frankly speaking, I do not at all understand the Navy's physical training and sports program leaders' position regarding track and field events and I do not understand the reason it is not being developed among the sailors. I think it is hardly necessary to prove the importance of the applied significance of this sport, which develops the necessary physical and psychological qualities in the sailors for them to successfully accomplish combat missions. Moreover, I want to point out that strong, resolute and brave young men are serving on board ships. I am sure that there are potentially a lot of future runners, jumpers and shotputters among them. This is a large reserve and all the more so since track and field events are currently experiencing a lot of difficulty in the Armed Forces and they are in extreme need of an influx of fresh strength. Therefore, by not developing a basic Olympic discipline among the sailors, we are thereby artificially restricting the field of selection and creating obstacles in the path of those young men who possibly have the power (with the condition that they train persistently, of course) to continue the victorious traditions of the Navy's track and field athletes of the older generation.

Leak in Submerged Submarine

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 78 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank S. Proskuryakov: "In the Ocean's Depths"]

[Text] RED BANNER PACIFIC OCEAN FLEET. The submarine was accomplishing a maneuver while submerged. Combat and political training expert SrSmn G. Razuvayev was standing watch in one of the compartments. While making the customary rounds, a leak, which was barely noticeable in the intricate tangle of branch pipes, caught his attention. The senior seaman immediately reported the malfunction.

While a short meeting was taking place, the leak increased. After slowing down, it was decided to get rid of the leak. Engr-SrLt A. Makovkin was summoned to do this. An experienced specialist, he knew that it would not be easy to accomplish this kind of operation while submerged; anything could happen. Displaying courage and self-control, the officer worked under a high temperature for an hour and a half in a hard-to-get-at

place. He sealed the hole and the submarine again proceeded at its assigned speed; soon afterwards, the crew successfully accomplished the combat training mission.

On the way to base, the communists of the submarine held a party meeting. Engr-SrLt A. Makovkin was unanimously accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU.

Submarine Tactical Trainers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 78 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank Ye. Mazul'nikov: "The Captain and Modern Combat: The Optimal Alternative"]

[Text] As the saying goes, Capt 3d Rank V. Kozhevnikov had the "enemy" submarine tightly in "hand." Its captain took energetic measures to break away from the pursuit: he decreased and increased speed and changed his diving depth--everything was in vain. By maneuvering at a distance which made it possible to maintain reliable sonar contact, Kozhevnikov did not let the pursued ship go; he handled the assigned task in an outstanding manner.

After all, a modern ship with powerful sonar equipment was designated as the "enemy" during the exercise; in its performance characteristics, it was superior to the submarine commanded by Capt 3d Rank Kozhevnikov. The outcome of the submarine duel was decided by the captain's high level of tactical expertise, by his ability to select the optimal alternative from the multitude of operational alternatives and his ability to consistently implement the decision he made.

While listening to Kozhevnikov's precise and thorough report at the critique, his colleagues unintentionally remembered the lessons from another search, one of the first in the officer's command history.

At that time, Kozhevnikov was well trained theoretically; he had a certain amount of sailing experience, however, he obviously still did not have enough practical skills for operating in difficult one-on-one situations. As required, Kozhevnikov and the primary control station team conducted enough training sessions in the shore training classroom. Moreover, situations approximating actual ones were modeled on the electronic trainer. Nevertheless, while carrying out a combat drill at sea, Kozhevnikov lost the "enemy" submarine several times.

This happened because he was conducting the target search in a stereotyped manner without a preliminary estimate, and he was not making full use of his ship's high-speed characteristics.

The first failure, whose lessons were thoroughly analyzed, did not discourage the young captain. While taking into account his previous experience, he conducted another series of training sessions on the trainer and he reinforced his practical skills during subsequent voyages. He was especially persistent in learning to conduct tactical estimates for different alternatives of searching for and attacking the target. As a result, it was not just the captain himself who had a clear, complete idea of the order of operations in combat, but he also achieved a situation where his subordinates, and first and foremost the primary control station team, also achieved this.

Nowadays, it is impossible to ensure superior navigation training for ships' captains and crews without using the resources of the training classroom simulators and trainers. They make it possible to model combat situations, play out an endless number of alternatives which can be encountered while carrying out missions at sea and, finally, they facilitate the development of psychological habits, courses of action, in a situation approximating a real one.

The trainer is a powerful means for the captain and crew to maintain their skills at the required level; it is an irreplaceable training facility for navigation training. And, if even the experienced commander does not use the trainer's resources intensively enough, he can lose the skills he acquired earlier. In this respect, I remember how one of the officers, who had considerable experience in a command position, incorrectly determined the details of the target's movement during a practice torpedo attack. This happened because he was visiting the trainer infrequently and was relying on his old resources of knowledge. He only performed with a rating of "good" at the subsequent range practice, although he had all the opportunities to fire at nothing but "excellent."

Of course, training efficiency on the trainers is completely dependent upon the ability to create a complex situation approximating actual navigation conditions during the training sessions. Unfortunately, you can still sometimes encounter cases where the same combat alternative based on the same data is worked on day in and day out; this alternative gradually becomes trite. This can lead to a situation where people wind up in difficulties at sea when

faced by an unusual situation and, sometimes, they will not be able to accomplish the assigned mission with a high level of quality.

While preparing for his first torpedo firing, the same Capt 3d Rank V. Kozhevnikov visited the training classroom on a regular basis. However, the actual situation which developed at sea was different from the one which surrounded the captain in the office. The "enemy" submarine maneuvered with different speeds and courses; the navigational and hydrometeorological conditions also left their mark on the captain's actions. And he made a mistake.

After this incident, Kozhevnikov made the situation a great deal more difficult during the training sessions; he tried new, original alternatives of attack. He conducted his next torpedo firing very successfully.

Nevertheless, no matter how good their benefit is, the trainers do not make it possible to completely recreate the situation which the captain will encounter at sea. They only help to closely approximate it, to study its components and to acquire the initial skills for working out an optimal alternative for a decision. The trainer can by no means replace the captain's intense training at sea, during distant voyages, where the officer's tactical expertise is finally polished. This comes most successfully to the ones who are spiritually and morally strong, the ones who have initiative, an inclination to innovation and are steadfast and daring in achieving their goal.

In the final analysis, the captain's determination and purposefulness, his creative thought, which is not quiet for a single hour, supported by his intense, independent work quests, doubts and discoveries, define the very possibility of achieving tactical maturity.

Now, while the ships are carrying out difficult missions during the summer training period, it is necessary to plan each voyage especially thoroughly, to motivate the captains to make efficient use of cruise time and to conduct research work in the area of tactics and employment of weapons and equipment.

It is difficult to account for the entire range of diversity of crews and combat situations within the limits of short directives and manuals. For example, before a submarine surfaces, it is recommended that the horizon be monitored

at a certain depth. However, there are variations in the sea's hydrology when it is better to accomplish this monitoring at other depths. And if the captain blindly follows the standard recommendation, he can make a mistake.

Here is a memorable incident when one of the young captains surfaced. He acted according to the directives and, at first glance, it was impossible to complain about his maneuvering. However, it was possible to save about two minutes during this maneuver by more efficiently changing speed. Although this point was not specified by the directives at the time, it did arise through the practice and creative quests of experienced captains.

An analysis of the results of each combat drill and each sortie at sea plays a large role in molding captains and developing their analytical thinking. For example, they are conducted with the indispensable participation of all ship captains in Unit X; moreover, each of those present speak and not just the ones who accomplished the mission. An analysis of the ship's operations frequently takes the form of a creative discussion whose results are evaluated by the senior commander. This helps in developing a unified point of view and in finding the optimal operational alternative. An analysis of the mistakes made at sea makes it possible for the rest of the captains to avoid them in the future.

A comprehensive, systems approach to tactical training simplifies and speeds up the formation of junior captains. The service career of communist and Capt 3d Rank V. Kolesnikov serves as an example of this; he is a captain who implicitly unites in himself an insistence on high standards and a broad, all-round tactical view; he does not spare any time or effort in his studies at the training center and then he perfects his skills at sea. Having arrived at the high position of ship's captain while still a very young officer, V. Kolesnikov quickly acquired the maturity of a sea captain and tactician; to a great extent, this was precisely due to his ability to think creatively and to find the optimal solution for the assigned mission within a short period of time and without mistakes. Confidence in his actions, which is based on the thoroughness of his estimates, and implicitly combining this with initiative and daring are the main characteristics of the tactical manner of this young captain, a former delegate to the 25th CPSU Congress.

Success in modern combat is unthinkable without the captain's creative thought. It is possible to work out ten different

alternatives for the situation on the trainer, one of which will be encountered at sea. But, it also happens that not one of the stereotypes which the captain mastered in the training classroom will be encountered in its "pure form" during a cruise. In this case, the captain must correctly discover the single, as they now say, optimal alternative which will lead to his success in combat, by relying on his level of training and creative thinking.

Submarine Commander Describes Crew Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 78 p 2

[Capt 3d Rank V. Kolesnikov, captain of an outstanding submarine: "Not a Single Laggard Nearby!"]

[Text] SR SM A. Balayev was in the far end of the compartment when he heard a muffled pop among the familiar echo of the machinery's monotonous hum. He rushed to the pumps and saw that one of the hoses had burst. This system was not in A. Balayev's area, however, the sailor knew perfectly well what had to be done in this situation. He quickly transferred operation of the system to the backup system. Soon afterwards, the broken hose was replaced with a spare and the system began operating again on the regular flow plan.

When I expressed my gratitude to Balayev for his clear-cut actions in a difficult situation, I automatically remembered how, not long ago, this submariner was at times flustered in the compartment and, in connection with the abundance and complexity of ship systems, he said: "Is it really possible to learn all this?"

While on a distant cruise, Balayev not only gained a good understanding of the fine points of his specialty but he also became acquainted with related areas. Of course, the main credit for his formation goes to Engr-Capt 3d Rank A. Martynenko, his subunit commander and a military affairs expert. At the same time, his compartment comrades helped the sailor to quickly overcome his lag in training. They were the ones who drew him into competition, motivated him to accept high pledges and to actively compete in the combat work.

An atmosphere of comradely mutual assistance in training and competition and a sympathetic attitude toward young sailors is being firmly and consistently established on our ship. This is understandable. After all, their entire subsequent service is determined to a great extent by how it

began. If the young submariner lags behind his comrades while taking his first steps, this lag can be maintained for a long time. By organizing mutual assistance, assistance from the experienced sailors to the newcomers and the laggards, we are at the same time stimulating diligence in training and enthusiasm in competition in every way possible.

When the position of bilge team commander was vacated on the submarine, a first term sailor, PO 2d Class V. Antipin--a submariner with determination and initiative and an outstanding specialist--was assigned to it although there were people senior to him in rank on the team. Time has shown that the selection was right. The service and moral example of Antipin, who has essentially worked at the level of a military affairs expert, has motivated his comrades to close ranks and increase their combat and specialty training level.

The Letter of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee on developing competition in 1978 emphasizes: "Not a single laggard nearby--this is the combat slogan for collective labor, this is the order of our time!"

Strictly speaking, the conditions of service on a submarine objectively facilitate the strengthening of combat comradeship and collectivism. While fulfilling a common mission at sea, submerged, and while living with the same desires, the submarine must be a monolithic collective. However, this does not come about all by itself.

It is possible to achieve a situation where the overwhelming majority of the sailors in a department or crew will begin to meet the norms. However, what can you do if one-two specialists are lagging behind their comrades at the same time? In this case can you take your bearings on the highest grade when evaluating the activity of the military collective? I don't think so. Just one submariner with gaps in his personal training can let down the entire crew at a critical point. This is why we thoroughly consider not just the best marks but also the worst while evaluating the results of training and competition; we lower the ratings for groups and teams with just one lagging sailor. During lessons and training sessions, this motivates the officers to pay the closest attention to those who are lagging behind and to do additional work with them.

A comprehensive approach through organizing training and competition presumes that the laggards, the average and

the leaders must constantly be under the scrutiny of the captain, the party organization and the entire collective. After all, competition is not just called upon to dress the formation but also to facilitate common movement forward. It is important to develop in people a healthy dissatisfaction with what has been done and a desire to surpass what has been achieved. It is possible that yesterday's best example may only deserve a mediocre rating today. To stop means to lag behind.

The young officer M. Dolgikh is serving as the head of our underwater ordnance department. After his arrival onboard ship, I began to watch Dolgikh's work with a certain amount of jealousy: the officer headed the department which I had previously commanded and which had a very good reputation. I was very concerned: would the torpedo men give up their positions? I tried to help the young officer with everything I could. And Dolgikh himself worked persistently, with all the fervor of the young and the enthusiasm of a man who loved his profession. The torpedomen were learning in an atmosphere of active competition and they did not lower the previously achieved results, but, to the contrary, they went further. They accomplished all their firing missions in an outstanding manner and the department rightfully won the title of best department for ships of the same class. Its experience was introduced in other subunits.

There are probably young specialists without the required experience aboard every ship preparing for a cruise. In certain cases, the captain has the right to replace them. Several captains frequently make use of this right; sometimes, I do not think it is completely justified.

On the eve of a distant cruise, Engr-Lt R. Fazylbakov arrived at our ship. We had the chance to replace him with an experienced specialist. However, we did not do this. And, as it turned out, we acted correctly. Officer B. Pavlenko, a military affairs expert, helped the young mechanical engineer draw up a detailed training plan and he helped him define specific competition pledges for the cruise. During the cruise, a transfer of combat work experience took place near the operating machinery. The school which Fazylbakov graduated from during the distant cruise, the help of an expert and his own enthusiasm made it possible for him to stand on a par with the other group leaders within a short period of time and to avoid lagging behind. WO V. Ivent'yev also did not

have firm skills by the beginning of the cruise and he had to carry out the difficult duties of planesman watch officer at sea. I had the right to leave the warrant officer on shore but I decided to take him on the cruise. At first, not everything turned out well with him; after all, it is a real art to keep a submarine at the assigned depth, especially when the boat is going into an attack. But then, we were all overjoyed when Ivent'yev began to stand watch at the helm more and more confidently with each passing day.

Trust inspires a man and helps him cope with the most difficult matter. Later, the political worker told me that after he found out that he was being taken to sea, Ivent'yev state: "I will prove that I am worthy; I will learn to work as well as the experts."

By sharpening their combat expertise during ocean cruises and striving so that there is not a single laggard onboard the ship, the sailors of our crew are successfully fulfilling their socialist pledges. We joyfully received the news that our submarine was declared the best in the fleet. This news arrived while we were located far from our native shores. This high trust obliges us to work even better, to fulfill the missions of the summer training period in an outstanding manner.

Suvorov, Nakhimov Requirements

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 78 p 4

[Article in column "Answers to Readers Questions": "Entrance to the Suvorov and Nakhimov Institutes"]

[Text] The editors are receiving a lot of letters requesting us to tell about the rules for admission to the Suvorov Military and Nakhimov Naval Institutes. Today, we are fulfilling our readers' requests.

Boys, age 15-16 who have completed the eight grade, are admitted to the Suvorov Military and Nakhimov Naval Institute; Moreover, they must be 15 years old not later than 30 September of their year of entry. Some people want to become Suvorov or Nakhimov cadets after finishing the ninth grade. This is impossible: it is not possible to enroll a student in the ninth

grade again and, thereby, artificially make him repeat a grade. There is no admission to the Suvorov and Nakhimov military institutes in the tenth grade.

All the documents required for entrance to the institutes are filled out through the rayon military commissariat at the candidate's place of residence. The documents are only submitted through the chain of command--addressed to the unit (formation) commander or the chief of an establishment--within the groups of Soviet forces abroad. Applications for the student's admission to the Suvorov or Nakhimov institutes are submitted by the parents, or persons replacing them, within the period from 1-25 June. More precise information on the procedures for submitting documents can be obtained from the military commissariat at the place of residence.

The following documents are attached to the application: the student's personal statement about his desire to study at the Suvorov or Nakhimov institute and become an officer, addressed to the chief of the institute; an original copy of his birth certificate; a certificate on his eighth grade education; a reference signed by the class leader and the director of the school; a Komsomol reference issued by the school Komsomol committee (for Komsomol members); a medical statement, issued by the medical board at the military commissariat or by a garrison military board, on the student's state of health and his fitness to study at a Suvorov or Nakhimov institute; two 3 x 4 cm photographs; a certificate on the place of work or nature of his parents labor activity, or persons replacing them.

You must bear in mind that you can only enter the Suvorov Institute which is closest to your place of residence. Each oblast, kray and republic sends its candidates to those institutes in which it has been allocated slots. The military commissariats have instructions on which institutes to send boys to depending on the foreign language they studied in school. Young men who have previously studied English or French are admitted to the Kiev and Leningrad Suvorov Military Institutes; those who have studied English or German are admitted to the Kalinin, Minsk, Moscow, Sverdlovsk or Ussuriysk Suvorov Military Institutes; those who have studied English, German or French are admitted to the Kazan' Suvorov Military Institute. Young men who have studied English are admitted to the Nakhimov Naval Institute.

Admission to the Suvorov Military Institutes is conducted from 1-15 August and from 15-30 July for the Nakhimov Naval

Institute. Candidates who have been summoned to the institutes are given a medical examination and take the competitive entrance examinations in mathematics (written and oral), Russian (dictation) within the scope of the eighth grade school program and in physics (oral) for the eighth grade program (the "Mechanics" section).

At the discretion of the chief of the institute, candidates who have completed the eighth grade of school with outstanding grades in all their subjects (except singing and art) only take one examination (oral or written). If they receive a grade of "outstanding," they do not have to take the other examinations, but, if they receive a grade of "good" or "satisfactory," they take the remaining three examinations on an equal footing with the other candidates.

The graduates of the Suvorov and Nakhimov institutes are sent to military educational institutions for further training in accordance with established requisitions.

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